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Abstract	
	This	paper	tests	the	limits	of	social	mobilization	in	planning	by	considering	its	ethical	and	practical	boundaries.	In	the	first	section	I	explore	two	theorists	of	social	mobilization	in	planning,	John	Friedmann	and	Mark	Purcell.	I	argue	that	both	rely	on	the	claim	that	there	is	something	morally	problematic	about	decision-making	in	planning	that	is	not	exercised	directly	and	democratically.	Moreover,	they	both	argue	for	the	morally	superiority	of	direct	democratic	control	in	planning.		In	the	second	section	I	consider	two	arguments	for	why	we	might	accept	the	view	that	social	mobilization	is	morally	preferable	to	other	forms	of	decision-making	in	planning.	The	first	is	by	arguing	that	indirect	centralized	power	structures	alienate	people	from	their	original	state	of	autonomous	control.	The	second	is	by	arguing	that	social	mobilization	will	lead	to	the	morally	best	outcomes.	Ultimately	I	conclude	that	neither	argument	works	well	and	that	there	are	not	conclusive	reasons	to	argue	that	there	is	something	morally	better	about	social	mobilization	as	a	decision-making	structure	in	planning	compared	to	other	forms	of	decision-making	that	don’t	rely	on	direct	democratic	control.	In	the	third	section	I	consider	subjectivity	in	social	mobilization.	That	is,	I	argue	that	social	mobilization	implies	a	certain	view	of	subjectivity	as	able	to	consistently	resist	social	and	political	passivity,	and	universalize	a	kind	of	perpetual	struggle	for	autonomy.	Then,	in	the	fourth	section	I	analyze	subjectivity	in	social	mobilization	through	the	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty.	Based	on	Merleau-Ponty,	I	argue	that	subjectivity	as	implied	by	social	mobilization	is	not	plausible.	Instead	of	viewing	passivity	as	the	enemy	of	justice,	phenomenology	reveals	passivity	to	be	a	necessary	and	fundamental	structure	of	subjectivity.		
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Foreword		Having	entered	the	MES	degree	program	with	a	BA	and	MA	in	philosophy,	my	approach	to	the	plan	of	study	and	major	paper	has	been	fundamentally	informed	by	moral	and	political	philosophy.	For	this	reason	this	major	paper	is	likely	atypical	for	a	paper	submitted	in	the	planning	stream.	Rather	than	focusing	on	a	specific	planning	problem	or	case	study	this	major	paper	(and	plan	of	study)	engages	with	fundamental	questions	of	subjectivity	and	morality	related	to	planning.	This	also	means	that	the	method	I	use	is	rather	argumentative,	and	engages	with	major	ideas	in	planning	theory	through	philosophical	scrutiny.			This	major	paper	is	also	centrally	situated	in	the	realm	of	social	and	political	theory	broadly,	which	is	consistent	with	my	area	of	concentration,	‘Social	and	Political	Theory	in	Planning”.	This	also	serves	as	a	logical	step	in	my	academic	development,	as	I	will	be	continuing	my	studies	at	the	University	of	Toronto	in	the	PhD	in	Political	Science	(Theory	Stream)	in	September	2017.		As	mentioned	in	my	plan	of	study,	one	of	my	main	objectives	was	to	explore	the	moral	justifications	of	certain	approaches	to	planning.	This	major	paper	does	just	that,	by	exploring	a	certain	strand	of	leftist	planning	theory	broadly	referred	to	as	social	mobilization.	This	major	paper	also	addresses	at	least	some	aspect	in	each	of	my	three	component	areas.	First,	by	engaging	with	ideas	of	political	subjectivity.	Second,	by	appealing	to	major	figures	in	planning	theory	(such	as	John	Friedmann).	Third,	by	incorporating	concrete	examples	of	planning	practice	(such	as	NIMBYism)	and	democratic	decision-making	in	planning.			
5		
Table	of	Contents	
Introduction	.......................................................................................................................................................	6	
Chapter	One:	The	Morality	of	Social	Mobilization	.........................................	10	Friedmann’s	Planning	Theory	......................................................................................................................	11	Friedmann	and	Radical	Planning	................................................................................................................	14	Friedmann’s	Political	Community	..............................................................................................................	16	Purcell’s	Planning	Theory	..............................................................................................................................	18	Purcell’s	View	of	Democracy	.........................................................................................................................	20	Friedmann	and	Purcell	Compared	.............................................................................................................	22	
Chapter	Two:	Testing	the	Morality	of	Social	Mobilization	......................	24	The	Alienation	Argument		..............................................................................................................................	26	Harm,	Predispositions,	and	Autonomy	.....................................................................................................	27	Autonomy	as	Social	Predisposition	............................................................................................................	29	The	Socially	Mobilized	Outcomes	Argument	.........................................................................................	32	Social	Mobilization	in	Practice	.....................................................................................................................	33	Considering	the	Outcomes	.............................................................................................................................	35	NIMBYism	and	Social	Mobilization	............................................................................................................	37	Social	Movements	and	Social	Mobilization	.............................................................................................	39	The	Moral	Implications	...................................................................................................................................	42	
Chapter	Three:	Subjectivity	in	Social	Mobilization	.......................................	45	Towards	a	Socially	Mobilized	Population	in	Friedmann	and	Purcell		........................................	46	Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity:	Activity	and	Passivity	.....................................................................	48	Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity:	Resisting	Passivity	...........................................................................	51	
Chapter	Four:	Phenomenology	and	Social	Mobilization	..........................	54	Objective	Thought	and	Merleau-Ponty	....................................................................................................	54	Social	Mobilization	and	the	‘Thinking	Subject’	.....................................................................................	56	The	Habit-Body	and	Non-Representational	Passive	Perception	..................................................	57	The	Habit-Body	and	Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity	..........................................................................	60	Habits	of	Politics,	The	Politics	of	Habit:	Phenomenological	Lessons	..........................................	62	The	Practical	Implications:	Habit	as	Necessity	.....................................................................................	63	
Conclusion	.........................................................................................................................................................	66	
Bibliography	....................................................................................................................................................	69		 		
6		
Introduction	
	This	major	paper	is	an	attempt	to	untangle	certain	contradictions	and	confusions	that	I	have	detected	in	academic	planning	theory	and	professional	discourse.	I	witnessed	an	instance	of	this	contradictory	discourse	at	a	panel	on	planning	and	climate	change.	The	panel	consisted	of	several	planning	academics	and	high-level	municipal	professionals.	During	the	question	and	answer	period	the	issue	of	how	planning	might	best	address	climate	change	was	raised.	I	noticed	that	the	same	people	would	recite	two	inconsistent	kinds	of	answers.	On	the	one	hand,	they	diagnosed	the	major	problem	to	be	lack	of	meaningful	community	participation	and	grassroots	organizing.	On	the	other	hand,	they	also	argued	that	planning	departments	are	too	weak	to	overcome	burdensome	NIMBYism	(not-in-my-backyard)	and	politics.		Thus,	the	sentiment	is	basically	this.	Planning	should	be	more	driven	by	the	grassroots	community	and	planning	is	ineffective	because	public	participation,	and	sometimes	the	corresponding	political	pressure	reject	good	ideas.	The	contradiction,	in	case	it	is	not	obvious,	is	that	in	the	first	case	the	problem	is	not	enough	participation	and	in	the	second	case	the	problem	is	too	much	of	a	certain	kind	of	participation	(NIMBYism).	Could	it	be	the	case	that	both	these	claims	are	true?	Admittedly,	it	likely	depends	on	the	particular	planning	context.	Often	however,	what	planners	seem	to	mean	is	that	they	want	more	public	participation	as	long	as	that	participation	agrees	with	certain	progressive	principles.	So	the	problem	is	not	so	much	lack	of	community	participation	generally,	but	lack	of	participation	driven	by	the	‘right	kind’	of	principles	in	particular.		I	think	this	contradiction	anticipates	the	dilemma	in	planning	theory	between	privileging	the	process	versus	the	outcome	in	planning.	Planners	pay	a	lot	of	lip	service	to	the	process	of	public	participation	while	at	the	same	time	they	hold	a	number	of	concrete	beliefs	about	outcomes	they’d	like	to	see	happen.	I	remembered	that	a	certain	approach	to	urban	political	theory	privileges	the	process	of	grassroots	public	control	over	the	importance	of	specific	outcomes.	This	stream	can	be	broadly	described	as	a	social	mobilization	view	of	planning.	The	animating	
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claim	in	social	mobilization	is	that	the	planning	process	ought	to	be	driven	and	controlled	by	the	people	that	live	in	the	community.	In	addition	to	this	positive	claim,	social	mobilization	is	driven	by	the	negative	claim	that	any	social	or	political	structures	that	interfere	with	people’s	direct	control	of	the	planning	process	should	be	opposed.	While	few	planning	theorists	would	make	these	precise	claims,	many	imply	some	versions	of	them.	Indeed,	a	lot	of	critical	planning	and	urban	theory	denounces	centralized	power	structures	as	the	root	cause	of	problems	in	planning,	both	normative	and	practical.	Susan	Fainstein	places	what	I	call	social	mobilization	into	the	broad	category	of	‘just	city’	theory.	This	wide	theoretical	approach	adopts	a	utopian	way	of	thinking	in	planning	theory	by	advocating	for	a	number	of	revolutionary	leftist	ideas	meant	to	address	justice	in	the	city.	Thinkers	in	this	tradition	include	David	Harvey,	Neil	Brenner,	Manuel	Castells,	Peter	Marcuse,	John	Friedmann,	and	Fainstein	herself,	among	many	others.	As	Fainstein	argues,	just	city	theorists	fall	into	two	camps,	political	economists	and	radical	democrats.	Radical	democrats	“believe	that	progressive	social	change	results	only	from	the	exercise	of	power	by	those	who	previously	had	been	excluded	from	power.	Participation	is	the	vehicle	through	which	that	power	asserts	itself	(Fainstein,	2000,	p.	15)”.	Thus,	on	this	definition,	social	mobilization	is	a	radical	democratic	approach	to	planning.			Another	very	influential	figure	in	urban	social	mobilization	is	Henri	Lefebvre.	His	idea	of	‘autogestion’,	meaning	literally	self-management,	is	often	used	as	an	alternative	to,	and	critique	of,	state-centred	planning.	According	to	Neil	Brenner,	Lefebvre’s	basic	idea	is	that	because	state-capitalism	has	lead	to	an	unjust	set	of	social	and	material	relations,	all	social	and	political	institutions	should	be	radically	democratized	with	decision-making	power	returning	to	the	people	(Brenner,	2001,	p.	795;	Lefebvre,	1976,	p.	120).	According	to	Lefebvre,	legitimate	democratization	must	emerge	from	the	grassroots	spontaneously	in	a	way	that	it	fills	the	social	void	left	by	the	state	(Lefebvre,	1976,	p	120).	In	a	significant	sense,	social	mobilization	is	a	kind	of	utopian	anarchy	that	sees	problems	in	social	and	political	life	as	a	direct	result	of	citizens	no	longer	exercising	direct	control	of	their	conditions.	Regaining	direct	control	is	the	site	of	utopian	potential.		
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	 The	above	is	a	view	I	have	heard	endorsed,	in	various	forms,	from	both	fellow	graduate	students	and	professors.	There	seems	to	be	a	kind	of	totalizing	critique	of	state	institutions	and	capitalism	coupled	with	an	absolute	faith	in	grassroots	community	control	that	has	never	seemed	especially	convincing	to	me.	The	reasons	for	my	skepticism	were	not	initially	clear	to	me,	especially	since	I	consider	myself	to	be	politically	left.	Moreover,	there	are	many	concrete	critiques	of	neoliberalism	consistent	with	social	mobilization	that	I	do	find	convincing.	Something	about	the	way	it	is	often	presented	in	critical	planning	and	environmental	studies	left	me	intellectually	unsatisfied.		Therefore,	this	paper	is	an	attempt	give	meaning	and	content	to	my	skepticism.	The	approach	I	take	tests	the	limits	of	social	mobilization	in	planning	by	considering	its	ethical	and	practical	boundaries.	In	the	first	section	I	explore	two	theorists	that	I	see	as	paradigmatic	examples	of	social	mobilization,	John	Friedmann	and	Mark	Purcell.	I	argue	that	both	theorists	rely	on	the	claim	that	there	is	something	morally	problematic	about	power	that	is	not	exercised	directly.	Moreover,	they	both	argue	that	there	is	something	morally	preferable	about	direct	democratic	control.	This	set	of	claims	is	what	I	will	call	claim	1.		In	the	second	section	I	scrutinize	claim	1	by	considering	why	we	might	accept	the	view	that	social	mobilization	is	morally	preferable	to	other	views	that	do	not	rely	on	direct	democratic	control.	I	consider	two	arguments	in	favour	of	claim	1.	The	first	is	by	arguing	that	indirect	centralized	power	structures	alienate	people	from	their	predisposition	to	control	their	own	conditions.	The	second	is	by	arguing	that	social	mobilization	will	lead	to	the	morally	best	outcomes.	Ultimately	I	argue	that	both	defenses	of	claim	1	fail,	and	that	there	are	good	reasons	to	reject	the	idea	that	there	is	something	inherently	morally	preferable	about	social	mobilization	as	a	decision-making	structure	in	planning.	In	the	third	section	I	consider	subjectivity	in	social	mobilization.	That	is,	I	argue	that	social	mobilization	implies	a	certain	view	of	subjectivity	as	able	to	consistently	resist	social	and	political	passivity,	and	universalize	a	kind	of	perpetual	struggle	for	autonomy,	even	if	that	struggle	does	not	lead	to	actual	universalized	autonomy.	In	the	fourth	and	final	section	I	analyze	subjectivity	in	social	mobilization	
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through	the	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty.	Based	on	Merleau-Ponty,	I	argue	that	subjectivity	as	implied	by	social	mobilization	is	not	plausible.	Instead	of	viewing	passivity	as	the	enemy	of	justice,	phenomenology	reveals	passivity	to	be	a	necessary	and	fundamental	structure	of	functioning	subjectivity.			Ultimately	my	goal	is	not	to	condemn	all	forms	of	social	mobilization,	but	rather	to	test	how	far	pure	versions	can	take	us,	both	practically	and	ethically.	Indeed,	social	movements	are	obviously	an	important	aspect	of	a	vibrant	political	culture.	However,	I	question	the	reductive	way	social	mobilization	condemns	all	centralized	power	structures	in	planning	and	politics.	Rather	than	a	condemnation	of	social	mobilization	writ	large,	this	major	paper	should	be	read	as	a	plea	for	nuanced	thinking	in	leftist	planning	theory.		
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Chapter	One:	The	Morality	of	Social	Mobilization	in	Planning	
Theory	
	As	I	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	social	mobilization	in	planning	theory	is	the	view	that	the	planning	process	should	be	driven	directly	by	the	(socially	mobilized)	population,	rather	than	external	processes	and	entities	(such	as	capitalism	and	state	bureaucracies).	This	paper	will	focus	on	what	I	see	as	two	of	social	mobilization’s	purest	examples,	John	Friedmann	and	Mark	Purcell.	Although	these	theorists	have	different	conceptual	sensibilities,	in	this	chapter	I	will	argue	that	they	share	a	crucial	commitment	to	the	claim	that	there	is	something	morally	superior	about	a	decision-making	process	that	is	driven	by	a	politically	engaged	and	activated	population,	a	kind	of	direct	democratic	control.	Moreover,	their	view	seems	to	suggest	that	any	processes	or	entities	that	function	to	separate	the	population	from	the	decision-making	process	is	morally	problematic.	The	separation	of	the	population	from	the	decision-making	process	is	often	discussed	in	the	Marx-inspired	language	of	
alienation.		Mark	Purcell	appeals	to	what	I	see	as	a	useful	conceptual	distinction,	that	of	autonomy	versus	heteronomy.	I	would	argue	that	this	distinction	is	better	because	it	is	not	as	morally	charged	as	the	alienation	versus	non-alienation	distinction.	Autonomy	is	when	the	source	of	an	action	is	internal	to	the	thing	that	acts,	and	is	not	affected	by	external	forces.	In	contrast,	heteronomy	is	when	actions	are	influenced	or	originate	external	to	the	thing	that	is	acting.	Thus,	social	mobilization	is	when	the	decision-making	process	originates,	as	purely	as	possible,	in	the	population.		The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	show	how	Friedmann	and	Purcell	are	committed	to	the	view	that	autonomy	is	morally	superior	to	heteronomy	in	the	planning	decision-making	process,	and	that	there	is	something	morally	problematic	about	processes	and	entities	that	lead	to	heteronomy.	Indeed,	on	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	view,	forces	and	entities	that	lead	to	more	heteronomy	in	the	decision-making	process	are	not	only	seen	as	leading	to	unjust	outcomes,	but	also	contaminate	the	population’s	potential	tendency	for	self-governance.	Therefore,	
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according	to	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	views,	we	should	be	working	to	avoid	heteronomy	in	planning.	As	I	will	show	in	the	forthcoming	pages,	their	views	seem	to	depend	on	the	following	set	of	claims.	The	power	to	make	decisions	in	the	planning	
process	ought	to	be	squarely	and	as	completely	as	possible,	with	the	population,	
because	decision-making	power	executed	through	heteronomy	is	morally	problematic,	
therefore	we	should	struggle	for	autonomy.	Or	what	I	will	now	refer	to	as	claim	1.										
Friedmann’s	Planning	Theory	
	In	Friedmann’s	main	work	of	planning	theory,	Planning	in	the	Public	Domain,	distinguishes	planning	theory	into	four	broad	and	interrelated	theoretical	traditions.	Each	tradition	addresses	a	different	way	of	“how	knowledge	should	properly	be	linked	to	action”	(Friedmann,	1987,	pp.	73-74).	These	include	planning	as	social	reform,	as	policy	analysis,	as	social	learning,	and	as	social	mobilization.	From	these	traditions	Friedmann	develops	a	radical	view	of	planning	as	‘recovering	of	the	political	community’,	largely	inspired	by	the	traditions	of	social	mobilization	and	social	learning.	It	is	a	view	that	prescribes	the	planning	process	be	altered	to	depend	more	on	socially	mobilized	direct	action	from	the	people	as	opposed	to	planning	by	state	entities.	I	will	argue	that	this	view	accepts	claim	1,	that	democratic	autonomous	decision-making	is	morally	superior	to	representative	democratic	systems	that	are	indirect	democracy.	As	mentioned	above,	Friedmann	situates	his	theory	in	the	context	of	four	main	traditions	in	planning	theory.	Friedmann	does	this	to	demonstrate	how	historical	development	in	the	field	of	planning	has	led	to	a	crisis	in	connecting	knowledge	to	action,	a	crisis	Friedmann	argues	his	view	can	address.		The	social	reform	tradition	sees	planning	as	a	state-centered	process	whereby	civil	society	is	guided	by	scientific	rationality,	and	a	progressive	political	ideology.	Key	decision	making	actors	in	the	social	reform	tradition	are	planning	professionals	in	fields	such	as	economics,	sociology,	and	political	science.	Politically,	social	reformers	are	progressive	and	open	to	change	within	the	limits	of	the	existing	state	and	social	structure.	Thus,	social	reformers	believe	that	“through	appropriate	
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reforms	both	capitalism	and	the	bourgeois	state	can	be	perfected”	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	76).	This	can	be	achieved	by	addressing	three	main	concerns,	economic	growth,	increased	employment,	and	wealth	redistribution	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	77).	In	sum,	the	social	reform	tradition	is	defined	by	a	belief	that	ideologically	progressive	state-centered	action,	with	some	level	of	political	consensus	building,	based	on	instrumentalities	and	procedures	can	address	the	general	public	interest	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	136).		As	a	concrete	example,	ideological	expression	of	the	social	reform	tradition	in	planning	is	detectable	in	the	City	of	Toronto’s	Official	Plan.	In	it,	policies	are	outlined	to	achieve	“a	competitive	advantage	over	other	[cities],	locally,	nationally,	and	internationally	(City	of	Toronto,	2010,	1-3),	and	“to	ensure	that	housing	choices	are	available	for	all	people	in	their	communities	at	all	stages	of	their	lives	(City	of	Toronto,	2010,	1-3)”	Moreover,	the	plan	also	seeks	to	ensure	that	“a	variety	of	jobs	is	available	to	people	with	a	range	of	education	and	abilities	that	creates	and	sustains	well-paid,	stable,	safe	and		fulfilling	employment	opportunities	for	all	Torontonians	(City	of	Toronto,	2010,	1-3)”.	This	reveals	political	motivations	consistent	with	the	social	reform	tradition.	Much	of	the	above	expresses	a	desire	to	improve	on	the	existing	state	apparatus,	and	that	changes	within	the	existing	framework	can	basically	address	the	public	concerns	and	wellbeing.	In	planning	as	policy	analysis	there	is	less	emphasis	on	‘the	public	interest’,	and	instead	focuses	on	problem	solving	through	systematic	knowledge	application.	As	Friedmann	points	out,	the	policy	analysis	tradition	in	planning	has	no	particular	normative	position	on	matters	of	the	state	and	society,	and	for	this	reason	tends	to	accept	whatever	the	existing	ideological	context	might	be	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	79).	Indeed,	policy	analysis	sees	decision	procedure	in	planning	as	categorically	separate	from	normative	judgments	with	a	belief	that	the	objective	methods	of	science	can	and,	indeed,	should	be	used	to	make	policy	decisions	more	rational.	Consequently,	more	rational	decisions	would	materially	improve	the	problem-solving	abilities	of	organizations.	In	addition,	“proponents	of…	policy	analysis	worked	with	a	concept	of	system	that	involved,	at	its	most	elementary	level,	inputs,	outputs,	an	environment,	and	complex	feedback	loops	(Friedmann,	1987,	pp.	139-140)”.	Thus,	the	policy	
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analysis	tradition	tends	to	view	the	world	through	a	somewhat	reductive	lens	by	focusing	on	instrumental	reason	and	the	language	of	systems.	When	compared	to	the	social	reform	tradition,	policy	analysis	is	similar	in	its	use	of	scientific	methodology	and	belief	in	the	effectiveness	of	large	top-down	entities,	however	it	also	differs	in	its	apparently	agnostic	attitude	toward	normative	questions.			 The	third	tradition	in	planning	theory,	called	social	learning,	diverges	from	formal	scientific	methodology	in	an	important	way.	Indeed,	compared	to	social	reform	and	policy	analysis,	social	learning	seeks	to	overcome	the	divide	between	theory	and	practice.		Inspired	by	the	philosophical	pragmatism	of	John	Dewey,	social	learning	puts	epistemological	priority	on	‘learning	by	doing’	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	81).	In	social	learning,	meaningful	knowledge	is	achieved	only	by	practical	action	whereby	knowledge	gleaned	from	action	is	integrated	back	into	adjusted	praxis.	This	approach	to	planning	was	the	result	of	the	growing	view	that	existing	institutions	relied	too	heavily	on	instrumental	reason.	Whereas	thinkers	in	the	traditions	of	social	reform	and	policy	analysis	generally	believe	that	“the	social	world	[corresponds]	to	immutable	social	laws”,	social	learners	believe	that	societal	behavior	can	be	changed	by	active	social	experimentation	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	82).	Another	important	difference	is	that	in	social	learning,	relevant	societal	actors	are	no	longer	limited	to	technocrats	and	bureaucratic	elites.	Indeed,	grass-roots	activists,	individuals,	and	private	organizations	can	all	count	as	meaningful	planning	actors.	This	is	because	social	learning	views	legitimate	societal	change	as	emerging	from	all	levels,	whether	by	individuals	or	communities	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	185).	Therefore,	in	social	learning,	planning	is	no	longer	viewed	as	a	primarily	top-down	process.		The	final	tradition	discussed	by	Friedmann,	and	the	one	from	which	his	own	view	is	most	heavily	influenced,	is	social	mobilization.	Social	mobilization	stands	in	particularly	stark	contrast	when	compared	to	social	reform	and	policy	analysis	in	its	opposition	to	top-down	planning.	Indeed,	in	social	mobilization	relevant	actors	comprise	“direct	collective	action	from	below”	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	83).	The	social	mobilization	tradition	is,	first	and	foremost,	a	morally	informed	political	movement.	Within	social	mobilization,	Friedmann	makes	a	distinction	between	two	
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approaches:	utopian-anarchism,	and	Marxism.	In	utopian-anarchism	there	is	a	tendency	toward	a	“politics	of	disengagement	carried	on	by	alternative	communities	that	demonstrate	to	others	new	ways	of	living	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	83,	Author	emphasis)”.	Marxist	approaches	employ	a	“confrontational	politics	that	emphasizes	political	struggle	as	necessary	to	transform	the	existing	relations	of	power	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	83,	Author	emphasis)”.	As	Friedmann	points	out,	while	these	approaches	may	seem	opposed,	they	only	differ	on	tactic	for	societal	change,	but	not	a	difference	in	fundamental	ideology	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	83)1.	Indeed,	all	are	unified	in	their	moral	outrage	at	the	conditions	of	industrial	capitalism,	globalization,	and	concentration	of	power	by	ruling	elites,	and	all	agree	on	the	need	for	collective	action	from	below	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	228).			
Friedmann	and	Radical	Planning		Friedmann	argues	that	there	is	a	crisis	in	planning.	That	is,	“knowledge	and	action	have	come	apart	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	311)”.	Although	writing	in	1987,	Fridmann’s	diagnosis	of	the	crisis	in	planning,	a	crisis	in	our	ability	to	connect	knowledge	to	action,	likely	still	applies	today.	What	Friedmann	has	in	mind	is	the	many	ways	state-centered	planning	is	failing	to	address	problems	facing	the	city.	If	we	think	about	the	Toronto	context,	there	is	certainly	strong	evidence	of	an	impending	housing	crisis	driven	by	neoliberal	‘competitive	city’	policies,	and	planners	have	few	tools	to	address	it.	For	this	reason	there	is	a	growing	affordability	crisis	for	both	renters	and	buyers	in	Toronto	(See:	Wright	&	Hogue,	2017).	Debates	and	the	consequent	decisions	related	to	transit	expansion	continue	to	be	contaminated	by	politics	rather	than	good	evidence	of	need.	For	example,	the	decision	to	expand	transit	to	Scarborough	was	based	on	reelection	prospects	rather	than	actual	measurable	demand2.	With	such	a	muddle	of	planning	in	Toronto,	it	certainly	seems	
																																																								1	For	summary	of	precise	differences	see:	Friedmann,	1987,	pp.	251-255		2	See:	Toronto	Star,	March	28th,	2017	https://www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2017/03/28/council-discuss-next-steps-on-scarborough-subway-extension.html		
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plausible	to	wonder	whether	there	are	preferable	ways	to	‘connect	knowledge	to	action’,	as	Friedmann	would	say.			To	address	this	crisis	Friedmann	ultimately	proposes	a	radical	conception	of	planning	inspired	by	social	mobilization	and	social	learning.	The	project	of	radical	planning	is	“the	emancipation	of	humanity	from	social	oppression	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	301)”,	by	oppositional	and	experimental	social	struggles	of	both	particular	individuals	and	groups	employing	social	learning.	This	struggle	joins	the	universal	with	the	particular	such	that	particular	fragmentary	social	victories	are	joined	into	a	global	network	that	eventually	lead	to	“the	final	and	possibly	utopian	goal	of	a	free	humanity	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	301)”.	The	client	of	such	a	project	is	“the	mobilized	community	or	group	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	301)”.	Importantly,	Friedmann	sees	radical	planning	as	inherently	oppositional	meaning	authentic	radical	planning	cannot	be	state-centered	and	must	rather	be	the	result	of	an	impulse	that	originates	
from	within	the	community	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	301).	The	idea	is	to	encourage	cultivation	of	critical	consciousness	within	the	community	ultimately	leading	to	direct	action.	While	the	state	cannot	be	involved	in	fostering	authentic	critical	consciousness,	the	role	of	a	community	organizer	is	an	important	for	the	success	of	coordinated	action	(Friedmann,	1987,	pp.	301-302).	Indeed,	for	Friedmann	radical	planning	is	concerned	with	organizing	the	community	in	a	way	so	that	relevant	skills	and	knowledge	are	imparted	by	connecting	different	localities	together	to	coordinate	collective	struggles	towards	housing,	community	food	access	(gardens,	etc.),	local	employment,	etc.	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	398).						The	knowledge	involved	in	radical	planning	is,	as	mentioned	above,	epistemologically	related	to	the	social	learning	traditions.	It	is	through	community	practice	itself	that	radical	planning	knowledge	is	created	and	used.	Because	radical	practice	is	envisaged	as	taking	place	mostly	in	the	context	of	particular	and	fragmented	community	groups,	the	setting	should	not	be	bureaucratized,	and	so	the	role	of	“planner”	as	specialized	holder	of	knowledge	is	best	avoided	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	303).	Just	like	traditional	forms	of	planning,	radical	planning	is	concerned	with	linking	knowledge	to	action,	however	unlike	traditional	planners,	radical	
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planners	begin	with	explicit	moral	and	political	critiques	of	the	present	situation	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	305).		Friedmann	also	cautions	that	coordinated	group	action	often	leads	to	the	emergence	of	a	decision-making	leadership.	It	is	the	responsibility	of	radical	planners	to	resist	this	tendency	and	ensure	that	information	and	participation	in	the	decision-making	process	is	spread	as	widely	as	possible	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	305).	Otherwise	there	is	a	risk	of	falling	into	the	same	elitist	bureaucratic	tendency	as	the	state.	From	this	we	can	conclude	that	radical	planners	need	not	be	part	of	the	state	apparatus	(although	they	can	be),	nor	do	they	need	to	have	specific	technical	skills	(though	they	can	be	useful).	Instead,	radical	planners	connect	critical	community	level	knowledge	to	action	with	the	express	goal	of	social	transformation.	In	this	way,	a	radical	planner	takes	many	forms	in	society,	from	community	organizers,	to	activists.			 	
Friedmann’s	Political	Community			According	to	Friedmann,	the	ultimate	aim	of	radical	planning	practice	is	the	recovery	of	the	political	community.	The	implication	being	that	something	of	essential	human	value	has	been	lost.	In	this	chapter	I	will	address	two	related	subjects.	First	I	will	explain	what	Friedmann	means	by	the	concept	of	“political	community”	and	why	he	thinks	it	is	essential	to	his	account,	or	indeed	any	political	theory.	Second,	I	will	consider	more	precisely	the	specifics	of	the	political	community	that	Friedmann	envisions.	That	is,	get	clear	on	what	it	is	that	will	be	recovered.		 Friedmann	prefaces	his	account	of	radical	practice	with	a	defense	of	certain	fundamental	assumptions.	Specifically,	Friedmann	wants	to	assume	the	existence	of	public	interest,	and	thus,	a	public	domain.	Indeed,	as	Friedmann	explains,	“the	recovery	of	political	community	requires	that	we	believe	in	the	reality	of	common	interest	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	314)”.	Without	such	a	belief,	Friedmann	cautions,	we	risk	leaving	ourselves	undefended	to	the	possibility	of	an	authoritarian	repressive	state.	This	follows	from	the	idea	that	every	normative	claim	about	a	policy	or	action’s	moral	rightness	or	wrongness	contains	a	claim	about	what	is	good	for	
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human	beings	generally.	Claiming	on	the	basis	of	good	for	human	beings	generally	is	equivalent	to	claims	in	the	name	of	a	common	interest.	Friedmann’s	ultimately	argues	the	common	good	consists	in	recognizing	the	public	domain	as	essentially	the	right	to	self-govern	and	self-determine.	That	is,	the	right	to	true	self-governing	democracy.	This	is	something	Friedmann	argues	the	state	apparatus	has	subverted	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	339-340).			 The	next	question	to	answer	is	this;	what	does	this	recovered	political	community	look	like	for	Friedmann?	We	can	begin	with	two	central	aims.	The	first	is	to	increase	“the	relative	access	of	individuals	and	groups	to	the	several	forums	of	collective	decision-making.	The	second	is	to	strengthen	individual	and	group	ability	to	influence	contested	outcomes	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	346).	Friedmann	argues	that	the	current	imbalances	of	power	(income	inequality,	etc.)	can	only	be	corrected	“through	a	reactivated	political	life	that	will	draw	the	masses	of	those	who	now	are	relatively	powerless	into	the	processes	of	civil	governance	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	347)”.	A	recovered	political	community	should	contain	equal	access	to	the	bases	of	effective	social	power,	a	collective	culture	that	actively	enhances	people’s	capacity	for	independent	critical	thinking,	where	the	legitimate	power	of	the	state	and	the	economy	is	subordinated	to	“the	people’s	sovereign	will	at	all	levels	of	territorial	life	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	348)”.	Moreover,	a	recovered	political	community	will	shift	the	logic	of	market	relations	to	a	rich	mix	of	development	goals	–	social,	environmental,	economic,	cultural,	and	political.	The	political	momentum	to	achieve	such	objectives	must	emerge	from	self-reliant	action	across	collectively	linked	communities	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	348).					 Based	on	Friedmann’s	view,	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	he	is	committed	to	claim	1,	that	autonomous	socially	mobilized	decision-making	are	morally	superior	to	state-centered	or	market-based	decision-making	(heteronomy).	This	seems	intuitively	true	since	he	prescribes	a	network	of	socially	mobilized	connected	communities,	and	a	“reactivated	political	life	that	will	draw	the	masses	of	those	who	are	now	relatively	powerless	into	the	process	of	civil	governance	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	347)”.			
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Purcell’s	Planning	Theory	
	Whereas	John	Friedmann’s	radical	planning	theory	is	a	response	to	a	crisis	in	planning’s	ability	to	connect	knowledge	with	action,	Mark	Purcell’s	theory	is	responding	to	the	social,	moral,	and	economic	harms	associated	with	neoliberalism.	Like	Friedmann,	Purcell	positions	his	view	as	“a	set	of	oppositional	democratic	attitudes	to	resist	neoliberalization	and	imagine	more	democratic	urban	futures	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	76)”.	For	Purcell,	the	process	of	economic	and	social	neoliberalization	has	had	increasingly	negative	effects	on	urban	development	and	democracy	more	broadly.	Neoliberalism,	as	an	ideology,	is	the	idea	that “open	and	competitive	markets	not	only	produce	the	most	efficient	allocation	of	resources,	but	they	also	stimulate	innovation	and	economic	growth	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	13)”.	Extended	to	urban	development	and	governance,	neoliberalism	has	resulted	in	cuts	to	affordable	housing,	less	investment	in	transit,	disappearance	of	public	space,	and	development	generally	driven	by	market	forces	rather	than	social	welfare	(See:	Purcell,	2008,	pp.	17-18,	27-28;	Purcell,	2013a,	pp.	8-9).	Beyond	market	forces,	there	is	reason	to	think	neoliberalism	has	coercively	influenced	social	relations	as	well.	This	is	expressed	in	individualistic	attitudes	and	the	corresponding	logic	of	market	efficiency	presented	as	being	in	the	common	good	(of	the	economy,	jobs,	etc.).	This	makes	it	appear	that	certain	social	outcomes,	such	as	solving	poverty,	or	building	better	transit,	are	not	in	the	common	interest	because	they	do	not	further	the	logic	of	economic	efficiency	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	14).		According	to	Purcell,	it	is	important	that	we	do	not	think	of	neoliberalism	as	a	policy	of	non-interference	with	the	markets.	On	the	contrary,	Purcell	points	to	the	fact	that	neoliberalism	functions	as	a	state-sponsored	intervention	intended	to	further	capital	accumulation	by	private	interests.	Indeed,	it	is	state	policy;	for	example	by	bailing	out	too-big-to-fail	banks,	to	ensure	a	certain	kind	of	capital	accumulation	continues	all	under	the	guise	of	the	common	good	of	a	continually	productive	economy	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	15).	This	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	the	liberal-democratic	state	and	neoliberalism	leads	Purcell	to	argue	that	liberal	democracies	are	really	not	democratic	at	all,	but	rather	oligarchic.	Indeed,	liberal-
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democracies	with	their	selective	and	narrowly	defined	parliaments	and	institutions	function	so	that		 relatively	few	people	are	selected,	separated	out	from	the	population,	and	designated	to	govern	the	whole.	It	is	therefore	a	governing	structure	in	which	the	few	rule	the	rest.	This	arrangement	is	more	properly	understood	as	an	oligarchy,	rather	than	a	democracy	(Purcell,	2013b,	p.	313).		According	to	Purcell,	any	state	that	resembles	the	arrangement	described	above	cannot	be	properly	described	to	be	a	democracy	(Purcell,	2013b,	p.	313).			For	Purcell,	the	way	the	state	continually	props-up	neoliberalism	is	good	evidence	to	think	it	does	not	function	in	the	interest	of	democracy	at	all.	In	particular,	the	modern	liberal-democratic	state	is	responsible	for	authorizing	the	many	social	and	economic	injustices.	Examples	that	Purcell	points	to	include	the	many	US-sponsored	military	dictatorships	of	the	last	50	years,	including	Augusto	Pinochet	of	Chile,	that	were	designed	to	quash	democratic	alternatives	to	neoliberalism.	The	growth	of	multinational,	too-big-to-fail	corporations,	and	the	non-governmental	organizations,	such	as	the	WTO,	the	World	Bank,	and	the	IMF,	that	supports	the	existing	system.	The	crucial	point	is	that	all	the	above-mentioned	institutions	are	minimally	subject	to	democratic	control	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	24).	As	Purcell	puts	it		 Since	in	a	liberal	democracy	the	state	is	the	principal	institution	through	which	the	people	are	empowered,	neoliberalization’s	drive	toward	deregulation	and	outsourcing	means	that	democratically	elected	governments	are	less	able	to	manage	the	economy,	and	“the	people”	of	liberal	democracy	are	therefore	ceding	power	to	markets	and	the	firms	that	hold	power	in	those	markets	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	24).			Purcell	is	by	no	means	the	only	theorist	to	write	about	the	undemocratic	and	unjust	outcomes	of	neoliberalism3.	Indeed,	while	not	an	uncommon	critique,	it	remains	quite	a	central	and	important	theme	in	political	theory.	However,	our	main	concern																																																									3	Notable	recent	example	is	Undoing	the	Demos,	Brown,	2015	
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is	not	with	whether	neoliberalism	has	led	to	unjust	outcomes	(I	believe	it	has),	but	rather	how	best	to	respond	to	these	injustices,	and	plan	a	more	just	polis.	For	Purcell	the	most	plausible	answer	is	to	transfer	the	decision-making	power	from	the	state	to	the	people.	As	I	will	now	argue,	this	answer	is	based	on	the	belief	that	socially	mobilized	bottom-up	decision-making	is	morally	preferable	to	indirect	(or	alienated)	decision-making	(through	bureaucracy	or	capital	influence,	for	example).		In	thinking	about	what	is	meant	by	democracy,	Purcell	argues,	“we	live	in	a	world	that	equates	democracy	with	the	liberal-democratic	state,	which	is	a	form	of	oligarchy	that	sets	severe	limits	on	democracy	and	insists	that	anything	beyond	those	limits	is	impossible	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	26)”.	Purcell	wants	to	shift	the	meaning	of	democracy	to	something	much	more	revolutionary	and	direct.			
Purcell’s	View	of	Democracy		According	to	Purcell,	we	should	resist	the	negative	consequences	of	neoliberalism	and	transform	society	by	radical	democratizing	the	state	and	the	productive	capacities	of	industry	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	77).	Further	democratization	is	more	than	just	a	moral	good	in	itself.	Through	its	opposition	to	neoliberalism,	Purcell’s	view	of	democracy	is	argued	to	help	solve	problems	like	global	climate	change	and	the	“war	on	terror”	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	24).	Democratization	could	mean	any	number	of	things	so	it’s	important	to	get	clear	on	what	Purcell’s	precise	conception	entails.	An	important	presupposition	in	Purcell’s	democracy	is	that	it	has	little	to	do	with	consensus	building.	This	is	in	contrast	with	deliberative	and	participatory	democrats	who	base	their	theories	on	reaching	a	consensus	based	on	the	common-good	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	77).	Following	political	theorists	Chantal	Mouffe	and	Ernesto	Laclau,	Purcell	argues	that	all	decisions	and	their	corresponding	political	and	social	arrangements	will	necessarily	lead	to	some	unequal	and	unfair	outcomes.	This	seems	plausible	in	the	sense	that	no	political	arrangement	could	be	expected	to	satisfy	everyone	everywhere.	For	Purcell,	neoliberalism	and	the	institutions	that	function	to	support	it	cover	up	these	unequal	outcomes,	and	so	prop-up	the	fiction	of	reachable	consensus,	by	arguing	that	stable	markets	are	in	the	broad	common-
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good	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	78).	Indeed,	neoliberalism	justifies	itself	through	the	objective	language	of	‘efficient	use	of	resources’,	competitiveness,	and	‘stability	of	markets’,	with	the	explicit	assumption	that	these	concerns	are	for	the	common	good.		Ultimately	Purcell	argues	for	a	social-movement	model	of	democracy	and	planning.	True	democracy,	according	to	Purcell,	requires	specific	oppositional	attitudes.	Two	interrelated	conceptual	dichotomies	are	key	to	understanding	what	kind	of	oppositional	attitudes	Purcell	has	in	mind.	The	first	is	oligarchy/democracy	the	second	is	heteronomy/autonomy.	In	contrast	to	autonomy	where	actions	emerge	internally	through	self-management	and	self-rule,	heteronomy	is	action	that	emerges	in	whole	or	in	part,	externally,	influenced	or	governed	by	non-self	actors.	Oligarchy	is	a	form	of	heteronomy	where	a	few	(people,	institutions)	rule	the	many	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	74).	In	an	oligarchic	planning	context,	decisions	and	the	corresponding	activities	regarding	community	issues	are	influenced	and	decided	upon	mostly	by	actors	external	to	the	community	and	its	residents.	In	contrast,	a	democratic	planning	context	would	see	decisions	and	actions	about	the	community	made	only	by	the	residents	of	that	community.	Indeed,	planning	decisions	not	made	by	all	(or	at	least	most)	members	of	that	community	would	necessarily	veer	towards	heteronomy	and	oligarchy.		Thus,	true	socially	mobilized	planning	is	active	struggle	against	oligarchy	and	heteronomy,	and	struggle	towards	more	autonomy	and	democracy	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	74).	In	developing	this	view,	Purcell	draws	on	a	number	of	political	theorists	including	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Felix	Guatarri,	Michael	Hardt	and	Antonio	Negri,	Ernesto	Laclau	and	Chantal	Mouffe,	Jacques	Ranciere,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	Henri	Lefebvre.	As	Purcell	argues,	all	these	theorists	have	broadly	analogous	democratic	tendencies.	Indeed	all	of	the	aforementioned	theorists	see	democracy	as	a	“question	of	the	relationship	between	the	proper	power	of	people	–	all	people	–	and	the	entities	that	have	expropriated	and	organized	that	power”	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	73).	In	response	to	this	question	Purcell	seems	committed	to	the	view	that	“the	entities	that	have	expropriated	and	organized	that	power”	away	from	the	people	do	not	have	sufficient	moral	legitimacy.	As	Purcell	puts	it,			
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If	the	gist	of	modern	political	theory	is	an	effort	to	legitimate	the	transfer	of	popular	power	to	these	institutions,	democracy	is	then	simply	the	struggle	of	people	to	take	up	that	power	again”	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	73).		If	democracy	is	the	struggle	to	retake	power	that	was	expropriated	by	institutions,	and	Purcell	endorses	this	kind	of	democracy,	then	it’s	clear	that	Purcell	is	committed	to	a	view	that	morally	condemns	any	institutions	or	structures	that	contribute	to	heteronomy,	and	expropriate	power.	Case	in	point:		We	declare	our	intention	to	govern	ourselves,	to	keep	our	own	power	for	ourselves,	to	give	the	laws	to	ourselves,	to	manage	our	community	our	city,	and	our	affairs	for	ourselves	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	74).					 Another	important	aspect	of	Purcell’s	view	of	democracy,	also	inspired	by	many	of	the	above-mentioned	political	theorists,	is	the	idea	that	democracy	is	not	a	static	goal	that	will	eventually	be	reached,	but	rather	a	perpetually	necessary	reenacting	of	social	struggle	against	oligarchy	and	heteronomy	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	88).	Indeed,	we	should	be	careful	not	construe	Purcell	as	committed	to	some	naïve	view	that	there	will	one	day	be	a	planning	regime	where	all	citizens	will	act	directly	and	collectively	on	all	actions	related	to	their	community.	Rather,	Purcell	acknowledges	democracy	to	be	a	struggle	towards	something	unreachable.	As	the	saying	goes,	“it’s	not	the	destination	that	matters,	it’s	the	journey”.	Democracy	is	the	struggle	(journey)	for	it,	not	the	end	of	it.	It	is	the	struggle	from	heteronomy,	from	oligarchy,	from	the	state,	not	an	‘end	of	history’	resulting	from	these	struggles	(Purcell,	2016,	p.	12).			
Purcell	and	Friedmann	Compared	
	The	above	should	serve	as	strong	evidence	suggesting	that	both	Purcell	and	Friedmann	are	committed	to	claim	1,	that	heteronomous	decision-making	(in	planning	or	politics)	is	morally	problematic,	so	we	should	prefer	some	form	of	autonomous	direct	democracy,	in	some	form	of	bottom-up	social	mobilization.	
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Moreover,	since	Friedmann	and	Purcell	both	offer	us	prescriptive	accounts	of	social	mobilization	about	planning	and	urban	politics,	I	would	argue	that	their	views	depend	on	accepting	claim	1.	Without	accepting	claim	1	there	would	be	no	reason	to,	as	both	Purcell	and	Friedmann	seem	to	do,	argue	for	the	process	of	social	mobilization	over	its	outcome.	Indeed,	they	both	seem	to	be	arguing	that	there	is	something	morally	superior	about	social	mobilization	views	of	democracy.	That	being	said,	it	is	clear	that	both	believe	that	the	process	of	social	mobilization	will	lead	to	preferable	outcomes.	Interestingly,	it	is	difficult	to	extract	an	actual	argument	from	either	Purcell	or	Friedmann	on	why	this	might	be	the	case.	Rather,	they	seem	to	accept	it	as	self-evident.	Both	prescribe	their	prospective	views	of	social	mobilization	as	a	way	of	addressing	morally	problematic	realities	in	the	public	domain.	For	Friedmann	it	is	to	address	the	crisis	in	planning’s	ability	to	connect	knowledge	to	action,	either	because	of	state-capitalism	or	bureaucratic	inability,	all	shown	to	cause	social	harms.	Purcell	positions	his	theory	as	a	response	to	the	many	harms	caused	by	neoliberalization.	Thus,	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	moral	justification	for	preferring	social	mobilization	could	be	construed	as	reducing	harms	related	to	contemporary	neoliberalism.	In	other	word,	it	is	argued	that	because	the	current	regime	(of	heteronomy)	is	failing	to	meet	our	needs	it	is	probably	best	to	throw	it	away	and	start	with	something	radically	new.	To	be	sure	both	theorists	effectively	point	out	the	many	injustices	associated	with	the	current	political,	economic,	and	social	context.	However	this	is	hardly	a	conclusive	argument	for	accepting	claim	1.	Indeed,	neither	makes	an	argument	to	show	why	social	mobilization	(as	moving	toward	autonomy)	is	morally	preferable,	nor	do	they	offer	an	argument	for	why	it	is	the	best	way	to	reduce	injustices	(beyond	arguing	about	how	bad	the	current	situation	is).	In	the	next	chapter	I	will	consider	two	ways	in	which	Friedmann	and	Purcell	might	defend	claim	1.	
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Chapter	Two:	Testing	the	Morality	of	Social	Mobilization		
Introduction	To	defend	claim	1	we	would	need	to	establish	moral	value	in	the	idea	that	autonomy	in	the	decision-making	process	is	preferable,	because	heteronomy	is	morally	problematic.	Before	proceeding	it	should	be	acknowledged	that	in	general	there	are	plausible	reasons	for	viewing	autonomous	decision-making	to	be	an	intrinsic	good.	Indeed,	Immanuel	Kant	famously	derived	the	moral	worth	of	human	beings	in	their	ability	to	exercise	their	autonomy	and	reason.	However,	he	also	carefully	crafted	his	moral	theory	around	the	moral	limits	of	autonomy	and	reason	through	his	categorical	imperative.	That	is,	an	action	is	moral	to	the	extent	that	its	universalization	would	not	conflict	with	human	autonomy	and	reason	(Kant,	1964,	p.	70-72).	In	other	words,	for	Kant	a	functional	moral	system	requires	limits	to	autonomous	self-interest.	While	I	am	not	a	Kantian,	I	think	his	insights	are	a	useful	way	into	analyzing	the	implications	of	claim	1.	Specifically,	as	best	as	I	have	been	able	to	reconstruct,	Friedmann	and	Purcell	seem	to	view	heteronomy	in	the	decision-making	process	to	be	morally	problematic	precisely	because	of	the	way	it	places	limits	on	socially	mobilized	autonomy.	So	I	think	we	can	draw	some	kind	of	analogy	between	Kantian	morality	and	the	moral	status	of	autonomy	in	political	and	planning	decision-making.	Thus,	what	I	think	may	be	in	need	of	a	moral	defense	is	not	so	much	the	placing	of	moral	value	on	autonomy	–	since	I	believe	this	claim	on	its	own	is	fairly	uncontroversial.	But	rather,	it	is	the	way	Friedmann	and	Purcell	seem	to	morally	condemn	heteronomy	in	an	absolutist	way.	It	is	the	implications	of	this	that	I	will	be	engaging	in	the	forthcoming	pages.					To	further	the	above	analysis	I	will	consider	two	plausible	ways	of	defending	claim	1	that	I	see	as	following	from	both	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	views.	In	both	theorists	I	have	noticed	the	implication	of	the	need	for	a	return	to	some	lost	consciousness,	or	state	of	being.	For	Friedmann	this	is	exemplified	in	his	call	for	a	
recovery	of	the	political	community,	a	community	of	active	and	engaged	subjects	that	
once	controlled	their	own	conditions.	For	Purcell	this	is	implied	in	various	appeals	for	a	reappropriation	of	power	that	was	once	in	the	hands	of	the	people	(See:	Purcell,	
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2013a,	p.	74).	As	Purcell	puts	it,	“state	power	is	power	that	has	been	alienated	from	its	original	locus	in	the	bodies	of	people	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	38)”.	Thus,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	both	Friedmann	and	Purcell	seem	to	hold	the	view	that	autonomous	power	in	the	people	is	the	original	or	natural	state	of	being,	which	modern	conditions	of	capitalism	or	bureaucracy	have	somehow	subverted.	Indeed,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	they	seem	to	view	heteronomy	(in	the	form	of	state	and	capitalism)	as	morally	problematic	precisely	because	it	has	perturbed	us	away	from	our	original	self-organized	society.	To	be	clear,	I	am	not	claiming	that	Friedmann	and	Purcell	hold	this	view	explicitly	(though	there	is	evidence	for	this),	I	am	rather	considering	this	view	as	a	path	to	accepting	claim	1,	that	there	is	a	moral	superiority	associated	with	autonomous	power,	because	the	heteronomous	state	and	capitalism	have	alienated	us	from	ourselves.	After	all,	if	we	accept	this	it	might	be	possible	to	mount	some	kind	of	moral	argument.	Of	course,	the	obvious	problem	with	this	line	of	reasoning	is	the	naturalist	fallacy.	That	is,	something	being	natural	is	not	a	prima	facie	reason	for	it	being	morally	better.	We	would	need	to	also	show	that	the	fact	of	its	naturalness	also	brings	with	it	some	added	moral	weight,	perhaps	in	the	form	of	satisfying	a	human	predisposition.	In	other	words,	we	would	need	to	show	that	humans	are	predisposed	to	a	state	of	autonomy,	because	that	is	their	happiest	state	(or	some	similar	claim).	Therefore	the	first	defense	of	claim	1	I	will	consider	is	what	I	will	call	the	alienation	argument	for	claim	1.			 The	second	path	to	defending	claim	1	brings	the	question	of	process	versus	outcome	in	planning	to	the	forefront.	In	both	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	views	there	seems	to	be	a	focus	on	the	process	of	social	mobilization,	and	less	attention	paid	to	the	outcome.	Nonetheless,	both	theorists	are	clear	in	their	view	that	social	mobilization	will	lead	to	better	outcomes.	Since	they	see	capitalism	and	state	bureaucracy	as	the	main	causes	of	unjust	outcomes,	socially	mobilized	struggle	against	capitalism	and	state	bureaucracy	is	prescribed.	Thus,	the	second	defense	of	claim	1	will	consider	whether	the	process	of	social	mobilization	will	lead	to	the	best	outcomes.	To	do	this	I	will	review	examples	of	what	we	would	plausibly	consider	autonomous	social	mobilization	and	how	this	connects	to	good	outcomes	in	planning.	Moreover,	I	will	also	consider	other	social	movements	that	struggle	for	
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autonomy	(and	NIMBYism)	and	consider	if	they	can	be	considered	expressions	of	social	mobilization.	If	they	can	be,	this	leads	to	some	confusion	over	what	exactly	is	meant	by	autonomous	decision-making.	The	idea	that	the	process	of	social	mobilization	will	lead	to	the	best	outcomes	is	what	I	will	call	the	socially	mobilized	
outcomes	argument	for	claim	1.			 Ultimately	I	will	argue	that	both	defenses	of	claim	1	are	problematic,	and	that	it	is	not	plausible	to	ascribe	moral	superiority	to	autonomous	decision-making	in	planning,	at	the	expense	of	decision-making	processes	that	involve	heteronomy.	This	does	not	mean	that	we	should	avoid	social	mobilization	in	planning,	only	that	we	should	not	view	it	as	inherently	morally	preferable	to	other	forms	of	decision-making.	Because	moral	status	depends	on	the	particular	circumstances,	we	should	not	decide	in	advance	that	heteronomy	is	morally	wrong.			
The	Alienation	Argument	
	The	first	way	we	might	defend	claim	1	is	by	showing	that	humans	are	predisposed	to	autonomy	in	the	planning	and	political	decision-making	process,	meaning	that	heteronomy	is	warping	predispositions.	Another	way	of	stating	this	is	that	autonomy	is	morally	preferable	because	heteronomy	alienates	us	from	ourselves,	and	consequently	causes	a	kind	of	harm.	The	argument	might	go	something	like	this:		Premise	1	(P1):	Causing	harm	is	an	intrinsic	moral	wrong		P2:	Human	harm	is	caused	by	strictures	or	social	arrangements	that	prevent	or	limit	humans	from	doing	that	which	they	are	predisposed	to	doing.		P3:	Autonomy	in	the	(social,	political,	planning)	decision-making	process	is	something	human	beings	have	been	predisposed	to	doing.				P4:	The	state	and	capitalism	has	functioned	to	prevent	or	limit	human	autonomy	from	the	above-mentioned	processes.		
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Conclusion	(C):	The	state	and	capitalism	in	the	planning	process	causes	harm	by	limiting	autonomy,	and	is	therefore	a	moral	wrong.		 There’s	a	lot	more	that	could	be	said	to	elaborate	on	the	above	argument,	and	it	is	in	no	way	exhaustive.	It	is	also	possible	that	neither	Friedmann	nor	Purcell	would	agree	that	their	views	require	the	above	argument.	Indeed,	as	I’ve	said	I	am	using	this	argument	as	a	possible	way	of	defending	claim	1,	not	ascribing	it	to	their	views	(though	I	think	there	are	reasons	for	thinking	their	views	imply	a	version	of	it).	There	are	implicit	versions	of	this	argument	in	many	revolutionary	political	theories	that	rely	on	the	concept	of	alienation.	Indeed,	theories	that	appeal	to	a	Marxist	theory	of	alienation	tend	to	suggest	autonomy	to	be	the	“original	locus”	of	social	praxis.	In	any	case,	were	I	able	to	render	the	above	argument	plausible,	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	defense	of	claim	1	would	be	in	a	much	better	position.						It	should	be	noted	that	the	argument	schematization	method	I	am	using	above	is	somewhat	unusual	in	the	realm	of	planning	theory.	I	believe	it	to	be	a	helpful	way	of	enabling	us	to	see	what	kinds	of	claims	a	view	relies	on	for	its	plausibility.	If	any	of	the	four	premises	are	shown	to	be	implausible	it	might	require	social	mobilization	theorists	to	rethink	certain	unquestioned	assumptions	about	the	moral	status	of	socially	mobilized	planning.	Indeed,	one	of	the	reasons	I	have	chosen	to	schematize	the	argument	is	because	I	think	it	will	helpfully	reveal	how	many	assumptions	Friedmann	and	Purcell	rely	on	lack	clear	justification.	And	as	I	will	ultimately	argue,	once	considered	carefully,	P1	and	P3	are	lack	justification.			
Harm,	Predispositions,	and	Autonomy			In	order	to	properly	test	the	plausibility	of	P1-P4	I	will	begin	by	discussing	harm	and	moral	justification.	In	moral	philosophy	it	is	widely	agreed	that	interference	with	autonomy	is	considered	to	be	harmful.	To	take	one	view	of	harm,	Bernard	Gert	includes	amongst	his	list	of	harms;	killing,	causing	pain,	disabling	a	person,	depriving	a	person	of	pleasure,	and	depriving	a	person	of	freedom	(Gert,	1984,	p.	
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533).	If	harm	includes	depriving	a	person	of	some	measure	of	freedom,	is	this	harm	always	morally	wrong?	As	John	Stuart	Mill	famously	put	it	in	his	Harm	Principle,	power	used	to	limit	people’s	freedom	is	only	justifiable	to	prevent	greater	harms	(Mill,	1986,	p.	9).	Thus,	according	to	Mill	there	are	cases	when	limiting	freedom	is	morally	justified.	For	example,	for	the	purpose	of	preventing	certain	kinds	of	violent	crimes	few	would	argue	that	limiting	some	autonomy	is	morally	wrong.	However,	by	the	above	definition	it	is	still	harm,	but	justified	harm.	Therefore	I	would	argue	that	P1	is	false	because	harm’s	moral	status	is	not	absolute,	and	depends	on	the	context.			Even	if	P1	is	false,	we	might	still	say	that	the	moral	wrongness	depends	not	on	the	fact	that	the	state	limits	autonomy,	but	that	it	limits	a	certain	predisposition	toward	community	self-organization	or	planning,	as	Friedmann	and	Purcell	seem	to	argue.	Indeed,	aimless	autonomy	is	not	the	kind	of	predisposition	the	above	argument	is	trying	to	consider.	We	are	talking	about	communities	taking	control	of	their	own	conditions	of	governance	and	functioning.	In	other	words,	we	are	talking	about	people	controlling	specific	tasks	associated	with	planning	–	roads,	food	production,	shelter,	etc.	Assuming	we	accept	that	there	is	a	human	predisposition	toward	some	kind	of	social	self-organized	planning,	can	we	confidently	say	that	the	fact	that	it	is	a	predisposition	gives	it	a	special	moral	status	such	that	any	interference	is	morally	wrong?	Let’s	consider	the	case	of	another	radically	different	and	controversial	predisposition.	It	is	widely	agreed	that	pedophilia	is	likely	a	sexual	orientation	–	in	other	words,	a	predisposition.	Using	state	power	to	prevent	pedophiles	from	pursuing	their	sexual	satisfaction	is	justified	on	the	grounds	that	it	will	prevent	greater	harm	to	children.	In	this	case	we	are	limiting	a	person	from	pursuing	their	predispositions,	and	by	the	above	definition,	causing	harm.	In	a	way	we	are	forcing	pedophiles,	through	state-enforced	laws,	to	alienate	themselves	from	their	desires.	Would	we	want	to	argue	that	this	kind	of	harmful	alienation	is	intrinsically	morally	wrong?	Likely	not.	Obviously	pedophilia	and	social	mobilization	are	radically	different	and	I	am	in	no	way	trying	to	suggest	any	moral	similarity.	Instead	I	am	trying	to	show	that	the	fact	of	something	being	a	
predisposition	cannot	be	the	moral	grounds	for	which	we	preclude	interfering	with	it	
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(through	state-action).	Thus,	P2	is	true	only	inasmuch	as	strictures	and	social	arrangements	that	interfere	with	autonomy	are	harmful.	However,	as	I	have	argued,	sometimes	such	harmful	interference	is	morally	justified.				 		
Autonomy	as	Social	Predisposition	
	So	far	I	have	shown	that	interference	with	autonomy	(and	its	associated	harm)	is	sometimes	morally	justified,	and	that	something	being	a	human	predisposition	does	not	grant	it	a	special	moral	status	such	that	state-interference	is	never	morally	justified.	While	perhaps	the	above	might	be	sufficient	to	weaken	and	perhaps	defeat	the	argument,	I	still	think	it	is	worth	considering	P3,	whether	self-organized	social	decision-making	in	the	realm	of	planning	is	a	human	predisposition.	P3	seems	to	be	the	crux	of	political	theories	that	appeal	to	the	concept	of	alienation.	That	is,	somehow	the	state	and	capitalism	is	alienating	people	from	a	power	and	decision-making	they	once	enjoyed.	In	this	section	I	want	to	ask	what	grounds	we	have	for	believing	people	are	predisposed	to	socially	mobilized	autonomy?			 	To	begin	with	it	is	useful	to	restate	exactly	what	is	meant	by	self-organized	autonomy	in	the	planning	process	(through	social	mobilization,	etc.).	Based	on	what	both	Friedmann	and	Purcell	have	written	with	reference	to	alienation	in	the	decision-making	process	we	come	to	an	important	detail.	When	they	refer	to	a	recovery	of	democracy,	or	the	“political	community”,	this	tells	us	something	about	the	thing	that	has	purportedly	been	lost,	the	thing	we	are	predisposed	to.	Central	to	both	Friedmann	and	Purcell	is	their	calls	for	opposition	to	hierarchies	in	the	planning	decision-making	process,	since	hierarchy	leads	to	heteronomy.	For	example,	Friedmann	argues	that	radical	planning	has	a	“responsibility	to	resist	the	tendency	toward	the	concentration	of	information,	knowledge,	and	decision-making”	and	ensure	the	widest	possibility	of	equal	participation	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	305),	toward	the	eventual	dismantling	of	“the	social	barriers	that	constrain	self-reliant	practice	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	400)”.	Similarly,	when	discussing	the	possibility	of	integrating	principles	inspired	by	the	right	to	the	city	into	law,	Purcell	argues	that	
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	 The	greatest	danger	is	that	legal	codification	will	dissipate	the	energy	of	social	movements,	that	it	will	make	them	seem	no	longer	necessary.	That	outcome	is	a	severe	threat	to	democracy.	The	right	to	the	city	must	always	remain	primarily	a	political	claim	made	by	mobilized	groups	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	99).		The	above	examples	reaffirm	the	idea	that	for	social	mobilization	theorists	the	alienating	force	consists	of	social	structures	that	lead	to	heteronomy,	either	concentrated	power	or	codified	laws.	If	these	social	structures	(laws	or	concentrated	power)	are	the	thing	that	has	forcibly	alienated	us	from	something	original	(a	predisposition),	then	we	should	find	empirical	evidence	suggesting	human	society	is	predisposed	to	living	without	these	kinds	of	social	structures	(the	original	unalienated	state).	What	does	history	tell	us	about	human	society	and	hierarchy?	While	I	would	prefer	to	avoid	a	lengthy	digression	into	anthropology,	the	history	of	human	society	(Western	or	non-Western)	has	been	defined	by	hierarchical	social	structures.	Structures	that	tend	to	concentrate	power	and	limit	the	decision-making	process	to	a	select	few.	If	anything	there	is	more	reason	for	thinking	that	the	heteronomy	of	social	structures	are	the	human	predisposition.	Indeed,	I	would	even	argue	that	Friedmann	admits	as	much	above	when	he	argues	that	radical	planners	must	resist	“the	tendency”	toward	concentrations	of	power	etc.	A	tendency	seems	similar	to	a	predisposition,	something	already	within	us	that	we	must	resist.	Moreover,	Purcell	goes	even	farther	when	he	says		 The	struggle	of	the	people	against	oligarchy	and	heteronomy	is	also	very	much	a	struggle	within.	It	is	a	struggle	to	reclaim	the	power	that	we	also	want	to	give	away.	We	desire	to	be	ruled,	to	be	relieved	of	the	burden	of	ruling	ourselves	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	93).									Therefore	it	seems	as	though	Purcell	acknowledges	that	humans	are	predisposed	to	being	ruled	(through	heteronomy).	This	places	the	truth	of	P3	in	serious	doubt.	Indeed,	it	seems	to	me	autonomy	in	the	planning	decision-making	process	is	not	something	humans	are	predisposed	toward,	in	fact	likely	the	opposite	is	true.	In	
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chapter	4	I	will	explore	the	human	desire	for	heteronomy	(and	passivity)	through	the	phenomenology	of	Merleau-Ponty.	For	now	I	claim	that	using	the	alienation	argument	as	a	way	of	defending	the	idea	that	heteronomy	is	morally	wrong	(claim	1)	is	not	a	plausible	strategy.	This	is	because	autonomy	in	the	political	and	planning	process	is	not	something	we	are	predisposed	toward.	Therefore	moral	reasons	for	condemning	heteronomy	cannot	originate	in	the	idea	that	we	have	been	alienated	from	a	predisposition	if	that	predisposition	is	in	doubt.			Before	proceeding,	I	want	to	briefly	discuss	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	use	of	the	language	of	“recovering	the	political	community”,	and	“alienation”.	They	appeal	to	this	language	in	a	way	that	makes	it	seem	like	we	have	been	robbed	of	something	fundamentally	human.	It	is	like	the	romanticized	idea	that	we	must	return	to	a	time	when	we	were	in	an	unalienated	authentic	state	of	being,	when,	as	Guy	Debord	put	it,	“everything	was	directly	lived	(Debord,	2002,	1)”.	Yet	at	the	same	time	they	acknowledge	that	humans	have	a	tendency	toward	heteronomy.	This	seems	to	be	a	puzzling	contradiction.	To	be	clear,	this	is	not	a	critique	of	their	theories	per	se,	but	of	the	language	they	use	to	express	it.	It	would	seem	more	accurate	if	they	acknowledged	that	their	theories	are	not	a	call	for	a	return	to	something,	but	actually	a	brave	step	into	something	radically	new.	Since	the	autonomy	they	describe	likely	has	no	precedent.	In	the	above	I	have	offered	the	alienation	argument	as	a	possible	moral	defense	of	the	idea	that	heteronomy	in	the	planning	and	political	decision-making	process	is	morally	wrong	(claim	1).	The	argument	depended	on	the	idea	that	autonomy	in	the	decision-making	process	is	a	human	predisposition	and	that	anything	that	interferes	with	a	predisposition	is	harmful	and	morally	wrong.	I	ultimately	argued	that	1)	harm	is	not	always	morally	wrong,	2)	the	fact	that	something	is	a	predisposition	cannot	be	moral	grounds	for	defending	it,	and	3)	that	autonomy	in	the	political	and	planning	process	is	not	a	human	predisposition.						
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The	Socially	Mobilized	Outcomes	Argument			If	we	are	not	able	to	defend	claim	1	based	on	the	idea	that	autonomy	in	planning	and	politics	is	something	that	was	once	the	default	state,	then	we	need	to	find	some	other	way	to	argue	that	heteronomy	is	morally	problematic.	Specifically,	we	would	need	to	show	that	there	is	something	morally	better	about	social	mobilization	in	planning.	The	most	obvious	path	for	this	would	be	to	argue	that	social	mobilization	leads	to	better	outcomes.	Interestingly,	social	mobilization	seems	to	be	more	about	process	than	outcome.	Or	at	least,	it	is	much	more	concrete	about	the	way	it	describes	the	process	than	it	is	about	the	possible	outcomes.	Indeed,	social	mobilization	is	described	as	popular	bottom-up	struggle	against	the	social	structures	of	control	and	domination.	Essentially	it	is	ordinary	community	members	coming	together	to	fight	for	control	of	their	own	conditions	(social,	spatial,	political).	Both	Friedmann	and	Purcell	argue	that	this	process	is	the	best	way	to	fight	injustices	related	to	neoliberalism	and	state,	but	are	not	clear	on	why	this	is	necessarily	the	case.	That	is,	why	is	it	that	social	mobilization	logically	leads	to	just	outcomes	in	its	resistance	to	neoliberalism	etc.?	In	this	chapter	I	will	examine	what	reasons	we	might	have	for	thinking	social	mobilization	leads	to	better	outcomes.	When	I	say	better	outcome	I	mean	ability	to	solve	planning	problems	effectively,	and	morally.	Planning	problems	such	as	affordable	housing,	climate	change,	public	health	(addiction),	among	others,	are	the	types	of	problems	by	which	we	should	consider	the	effectiveness	of	social	mobilization.	In	other	words,	we	need	to	look	for	reasons	that	social	mobilization	might	do	a	better	job	at	solving	these	problems,	and	that	forms	of	power	that	involve	hierarchy	and	heteronomy	are	worse	by	comparison.		 Based	on	what	I	will	be	exploring	below,	I	will	argue	that	we	do	not	have	good	reasons	for	thinking	social	mobilization	leads	to	better	outcomes.	Indeed,	there	are	reasons	for	thinking	social	mobilization	can	lead	to	both	good	and	bad	outcomes.	To	be	clear,	I	am	not	saying	models	of	democratic	decision-making	that	rely	on	social	mobilization	are	bad,	but	rather	that	we	should	not	prefer	them	over	
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other	forms	that	involve	heteronomy.	Indeed,	we	should	not	prefer	the	process	over	the	outcome,	nor	should	we	prefer	the	outcome	with	no	regard	to	the	process.			
Social	Mobilization	in	Practice		It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	no	examples	of	a	fully	transformed	society	that	embraces	social	mobilization	in	way	that	resembles	the	societies	described	by	Friedmann	and	Purcell.	Indeed,	Friedmann	offers	little	in	the	realm	of	real	life	examples	of	movements	resembling	the	ideals	of	social	mobilization.	However,	Friedmann	is	pretty	clear	that	recovering	the	political	community	through	social	mobilization	would	need	to	satisfy	two	conditions.	First,	that	groups	and	individuals	have	equal	access	to	collective	decision-making.	Second,	that	they	have	equal	ability	to	influence	contested	outcomes	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	346).	This	can	at	least	give	us	some	form	of	reference	when	thinking	about	how	we	judge	the	favorability	of	outcomes	in	social	mobilization.	Indeed,	we	could	consider	how	outcomes	might	change	if	all	had	equal	access	and	influence	in	the	process.		In	the	case	of	Purcell	we	are	pointed	toward	actually	existing	social	movements	purported	to	be	on	the	right	track.	Some	such	examples	include		 the	Zapatista	movement	in	Mexico,	the	Landless	Workers’	Movement	in	Brazil,	the	Narmada	Valley	dam	protests	in	India,	the	meetings	at	the	World	Social	Forum,	the	movement	against	GMO	food,	and	blogging	networks	designed	to	provide	alternatives	to	corporate	media	(Purcell,	2008,	p.	82).				All	these	movements	share	in	a	common	opposition	to	the	state	and	neoliberal	globalization,	and	some	demand	for	autonomous	self-reliance.	In	the	interest	of	space,	I	will	only	make	specific	remarks	related	to	the	Zapatistas	and	the	Landless	Workers’	Movement,	since	social	mobilization	theorists	often	cite	them	as	examples.		The	Zapatista	movement	in	Mexico	gained	significant	traction	after	the	signing	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA)	in	1994.	The	movement	was	particularly	motivated	by	the	way	NAFTA	eroded	the	rights	of	
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indigenous	communities4.	The	Zapatistas	have	built	self-reliant	peasant	communities	around	the	Chiapas	region	in	Mexico	largely	grounded	in	Marxist-inspired	ideology.	Their	main	principles	consist	in	an	opposition	to	the	way	globalization	has	affected	peasant	workers	and	indigenous	communities,	and	a	commitment	to	participatory	bottom-up	decision-making	that	attempts	to	limit	the	emergence	of	centralized	leadership,	and	work	to	build	self-reliant	communities.	Such	communities	grow	their	own	food,	manage	educational	and	healthcare	services,	and	coordinate	collective	production	of	basic	goods.	Throughout	its	development,	the	Zapatista	movement	has	made	a	point	to	not	involve	itself	in	fighting	for	governmental	reforms,	since	it	views	this	process	as	illegitimate.	Nor	has	it	allowed	itself	to	form	a	political	party,	preferring	to	continue	its	own	alternative	way	of	doing	things.		 The	landless	Workers’	Movement	of	Brazil	is	similar	to	the	Zapatista	movement	in	its	opposition	to	neoliberalism	and	commitment	to	localized	self-reliant	community	building.	Specifically,	the	movement	is	composed	of	unemployed	and	landless	farmworkers	who	occupy,	camp,	and	ultimately	settle	in	absentee-owned	farmland.		Like	the	Zapatistas,	the	Landless	Workers’	movement	builds	its	own	functioning	communities	on	occupied	land	including	the	construction	of	houses	and	schools	(though	with	the	some	support	from	tax	credits)	(Hammond	&	Rossi,	2013,	p.	1).	The	Landless	Workers	movement	is	ideologically	grounded	Leninism	and	anti-hierarchical	liberation	theology	where	the	decision-making	process	functions	collectively	through	grassroots	assemblies	(Hammond	&	Rossi,	2013,	p.	2).			 The	above	examples	certainly	seem	to	share	the	major	theme	of	resisting	heteronomy	in	a	struggle	for	autonomous	self-reliance.	In	both	cases	there	is	an	emphasis	on	giving	members	of	respective	communities	equal	access	to	the	decision-making	process	and	a	moral	suspicion	of	the	state	and	capitalism.	Assuming	that	both	above	examples	function	as	effectively	as	advocates	claim	they	
																																																								4	See	Paul	Salgado’s	story	in	Jacobin	at	http://jacobinmag.com/2016/04/zapatistas-ezln-san-andres-marcos-chiapas/	
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do5,	to	what	extent	do	they	provide	evidence	for	thinking	social	mobilization	is	morally	better	than	any	other	form	of	decision-making	in	planning?	Moreover,	how	do	these	examples	help	us	in	thinking	social	mobilization	will	be	better	at	solving	contemporary	planning	problems?	I	will	attempt	to	answer	these	questions	below.		
Considering	the	Outcomes			In	this	section	I	will	be	considering	the	potential	consequences	of	privileging	autonomy	and	equal	access	and	influence	in	the	decision-making	process,	combined	with	a	moral	opposition	to	state-power	and	capitalism	(heteronomy).	Before	engaging	this	line	of	thought	I	want	to	notice	an	apparent	contradiction	operating	in	Purcell	and	Friedmann.	On	the	one	hand	they	want	to	resist	heteronomy,	work	toward	equal	access	for	all	groups	and	individuals	to	influence	decision-making	in	planning	(and	politics).	On	the	other	hand,	they	both	envision	a	progressive	and	inclusive	political	society	that	opposes	neoliberalism	and	state	power.	It	seems	that	they	assume	disadvantaged	groups	(and	other	groups),	if	given	the	opportunity,	would	necessarily	share	the	same	basic	opposition	to	neoliberalism	and	belief	in	controlling	their	own	conditions	in	the	city	and	society	(to	be	perhaps,	like	the	Zapatistas,	universalized).	Of	course,	this	control	would	need	to	be	inclusive,	equitable,	and	progressive	to	truly	follow	in	the	spirit	of	Friedmann	and	Purcell.	Adopting	a	political	attitude	that	constantly	opposes	any	top-down	limits	(heteronomy)	on	social	mobilization	while	simultaneously	expecting	that	the	populous	would	adopt	the	civic	values	envisioned	by	Friedmann	and	Purcell,	let	alone	to	solve	concrete	political	and	planning	problems	is	a	very	ambitious	expectation.	Indeed,	disagreement	seems	to	be	a	constant	in	human	society	as	even	Purcell	and	radical	democratic	theorists	acknowledge	in	their	skepticism	of	consensus	building	in	politics.	Again,	to	restate	the	seeming	contradiction,	Purcell	is	skeptical	that	we	can	ever	reach	consensus	about	politics,	let	alone	any	idea	of	public	interest,	yet	he	has	a	vision	for	a	progressive	self-managed	city	that	removes																																																									5	In	the	case	of	the	Landless	Workers’	Movement,	there’s	some	evidence	suggesting	it	sometimes	devolves	into	authoritarianism	(Hammond	&	Rossi,	2013,	p.	2)	
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as	many	top-down	constraints	as	possible.	Without	any	constraints	on	the	public	it	seems	reasonable	to	worry	about	the	outcomes.	This	contradiction	parallels	the	contradiction	at	the	planning	conference	I	cited	in	the	introduction	to	this	paper.	Planners	seem	to	have	a	clear	vision	of	‘good	planning’	and	wish	they	had	stronger	tools	to	overcome	NIMBYism	and	political	obstacles	to	get	the	job	done.	Yet	they	continue	to	espouse	the	need	for	greater	and	more	substantive	public	participation.	I	would	argue	that	there	is	a	subtext	in	both	social	mobilization	and	planning	discourse	that	amounts	to	idealizing	public	participation	or	social	movements,	but	always	in	a	way	that	imagines	the	public	as	agreeing	with	the	right	kind	of	progressive	principles.	We	cannot	construct	plausible	futures	built	on	this	kind	of	assumption.	Instead	we	need	to	think	carefully	about	human	fallibility.				Therefore,	my	overarching	concern	with	removing	top-down	constraints	is	that	we	might	devolve	into	dangerous	regressive	populism.	That	is,	not	only	might	we	not	get	a	better	outcome;	we	might	get	a	morally	disastrous	one.	Purcell	might	protest	that	my	objection	is			 akin	to	heeding	pragmatic	pronouncements	that	tell	us	only	some	things	are	possible,	that	advise	us	to	take	certain	political	goals	off	the	table	and	banish	them	from	our	imagination.	This	pragmatism	is	merely	laziness.	It	is	giving	in	to	the	seductions	of	heteronomy	and	oligarchy.	It	is	an	excuse	to	settle	for	passivity	under	the	guise	of	being	smart,	strategic,	and	pragmatic	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	90).		Pragmatism	is	probably	and	accurate	label.	Indeed,	I	care	about	how	we	can	get	good	planning	done,	and	make	life	in	the	city	better	for	people	–	in	other	words,	what	works	best.	For	example,	I	agree	with	Friedmann	when	he	says	the	four	pillars	of	a	good	city	include	housing,	health	care,	fairly	waged	work,	and	adequate	social	provision	(Friedmann,	2011,	p.	101).	It	is	just	not	at	all	obvious	to	me	that	social	mobilization	is	the	best	way	to	get	there.	I	want	to	ask	serious	questions	about	the	practical	and	moral	consequences	of	continually	opposing	top-down	institutions	(heteronomy),	in	order	to	leave	people	to	‘manage	their	own	affairs’.	I	am	not	trying	
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to	dismiss	radical	democracy	for	partisan	reasons,	but	rather	because	I	very	much	want	progressive	initiatives	to	succeed.			
NIMBYism	and	Social	Mobilization		In	planning	theory	and	discourse	the	issue	of	NIMBYism	(not-in-my-backyard)	often	comes	up.	While	the	term	is	somewhat	contentious,	it	is	basically	the	name	given	to	local	community	opposition	to	some	kind	of	proposed	change	to	that	community,	whether	planning	related	or	otherwise.	It	is	often	justified	by	those	participating	in	NIMBYism	as	the	community	defending	its	self-determination	against	government	or	developer	(capitalist)	interest.	Planners	often	express	frustration	concerning	NIMBYism,	especially	when	extensive	evidence	has	been	accumulated	supporting	a	proposed	initiative.	One	example	that	exemplifies	this	frustration	well	is	the	struggle	to	combat	drug	addiction	and	related	crime	through	harm	reduction.	According	to	The	Centre	for	Addiction	and	Mental	Health	(CAMH)	harm	reduction	is	based	on	key	principles	including:		1. Pragmatism:	it	is	assumed	that	some	drug	use	will	inevitably	occur	in	a	normal	society	and	it	is	best	to	reduce	existing	tangible	harms	rather	than	focusing	on	the	abstract	goal	of	a	drug	free	society	2. Humanism:	A	non-judgmental	humanistic	attitude	toward	the	fact	that	people	use	drugs.	Drug	users	are	treated	with	dignity	and	respect	(Riley,	1998,	Sec	9).	3. Centered	on	Harm:	“The	focus	of	harm	reduction	policy	and	programs	is	the	reduction	of	harmful	consequences	without	necessarily	requiring	any	reduction	in	use,	since	a	change	in	mode	of	administration	or	pattern	of	use	may	also	reduce	harm	(CAMH,	2002,	p.	2)”.		4. Priority	of	Goals:	Emphasis	is	placed	on	the	“immediate	and	realizable	reduction	in	drug-related	harm	rather	than	hoped	for	long-term	outcomes	(CAMH,	2002,	p.	3)”.		Approaches	to	harm	reduction	implementation	include	clean	needle	exchanges,	methadone	maintenance	treatment	(MMT),	and	drug	consumption	sites	(including	supervised	injection	of	intravenous	drugs).	All	of	the	above	approaches	are	supported	by	overwhelming	medical	evidence	showing	that	they	reduce	harm	by	limiting	the	spread	of	HIV/AIDS,	improving	health	and	social	outcomes	for	addicts,	
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increasing	use	of	addiction	services,	reducing	crime,	saving	public	money,	and	saving	lives	with	minimal	negative	impacts	on	communities	(City	of	Toronto,	2005,	p.	31;	Erdelyan	&	Young,	2009,	p.	11;	Health	Canada,	2003;	Toronto	Drug	Strategy,	2013,	p.	20;	McLachlin,	2011,	[136]).			 At	the	community	level,	for	such	harm	reduction	programs	to	work,	they	require	the	opening	of	facilities	to	service	drug	users	in	local	communities.	The	attempt	to	open	such	facilities	has	had	a	contentious	history	with	NIMBY	reactions	functioning	as	a	key	barrier	(See:	Bernstein	&	Bennett,	2013;	Alexander,	2010;	Tempalski,	Friedman,	Keem,	Cooper,	&	Friedman,	2007).	As	Christopher	B.R.	Smith	argues,	drug	treatment	spaces	suffer	from	a	systematic	socio-spatial	stigmatization	where	addicts	are	conceptualized	as	“as	criminally	‘dangerous’,	morally	and	criminally	‘deviant’,	and	‘diseased’	(Smith,	2010).	As	Smith	recounts,	community	members	have	sometimes	ignored	evidence	of	the	benefits,	with	one	person	calling	a	cited	CAMH	report	on	the	evidence	surrounding	MMT	“a	step-by-step	guide	on	how	to	indoctrinate	a	community”	(Smith,	2010,	pp.	12).	Throughout	the	years	NIMBYism	against	harm	reduction	programs	has	succeeded	(especially	in	the	USA,	which	is	currently	experiencing	an	opioid	crisis)	and	people	continue	to	die	everyday	from	something	harm	reduction	could	easily	prevent.		I	would	argue	that	the	above	example	is	useful	because	it	forces	us	to	consider	the	wisdom	of,	as	Friedmann	argues,	giving	people	equal	access	and	influence	in	the	decision-making	process.	It	seems	like	a	reasonable	worry	that	in	some	cases	people	will	use	that	equal	access	and	influence	to	exclude	and	harm	others	(based	on	not	wanting	addicts	in	the	neighborhood).	In	cases	where	people	are	clearly	wrong	about	the	evidence,	where	their	wrongness	is	actually	costing	lives,	centralized	power	can	step	in	to	do	the	morally	right	thing.	Purcell	addresses	the	NIMBYism	concern	by	essentially	dismissing	it	as	a	bad	“habit	of	thought”.	Instead	he	advocates	for	a	new	habit	of	thought	that	“refuses	to	fall	back	on	the	State…[and]	forces	us	to	ask	how	we	can	negotiate	these	questions	without	the	State	(Purcell,	2016,	p.	9)”.	He	continues	by	pointing	out	that		
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There	are	countless	examples	of	people	working	out	questions	like	this	for	themselves,	without	any	significant	involvement	by	the	State.	These	examples	range	from	the	mundane	(neighbors	negotiating	how	to	use	the	parking	spaces	on	their	street)	to	the	spectacular	(people	in	informal	settlements	figuring	out	how	to	hook	up	and	regulate	an	electrical	system	for	tens	of	thousands	of	people).	These	kind	of	relations,	both	among	communities	and	between	smaller	communities	and	wider	publics,	are	being	negotiated	all	the	time,	in	real	life,	without	the	State,	by	urban	inhabitants	themselves.	And	so	the	empirical	habit	of	thought	here	is:	pay	attention	to	these	practices	(Purcell,	2016,	p.	10).			I	am	paying	attention	to	those	practices,	but	I	argue	that	we	must	pay	attention	to	the	full	range	of	human	practices	and	decision-making.	People	are	clearly	vulnerable	to	making	morally	problematic	decisions	and	political	theory	should	take	this	possibility	seriously.	Thus,	I	want	to	argue	that	inasmuch	as	NIMBYism	against	harm	reduction	is	an	instance	of,	as	Purcell	would	say,	people	demanding	control	of	their	own	conditions,	it	is	an	example	of	how	we	cannot	always	assume	such	demands	will	lead	to	morally	better	outcomes.					
Social	Movements	and	Social	Mobilization		Beyond	planning	disputes	it	is	helpful	to	consider	social	movements	more	generally,	especially	those	with	an	ideological	element	of	self-reliance.	As	discussed	earlier,	Purcell	points	to	several	examples	of	social	movements	as	instances	of	people	demanding	control	of	their	own	conditions,	demands	for	democracy.	In	addition	to	examples	listed	above,	Purcell	cites	2009	protests	in	Iran,	the	Arab	Spring,	and	movements	like	Occupy	Wall	Street,	as	instances	of	“absolute	democracy”	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	90).	Even	if	we	accept	the	most	favorable	account	of	the	above-mentioned	social	movements,	I	can	just	as	easily	cherry	pick	examples	of	social	movements	with	morally	problematic	ends.	For	example,	recent	anti-globalist	right-wing	populism	in	the	United	States,	partially	credited	with	the	election	of	Donald	Trump.	This	recent	American	anti-globalism	shares	its	ideological	lineage	with	long-
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standing	tradition	of	Patriot	Militia	movements	that	mobilize	against	the	perceived	“tyranny	of	the	federal	government”6.	Militia	ideology	is	heavily	informed	by	a	self-reliant,	‘frontierist’	mentality.	As	one	member	of	the	Militia	of	Montana	put	it				 In	the	cities	people	are	much	more	dependent	on	government	for	their	services.	If	the	electricity	fails	they’re	screwed.	Here	we	light	a	candle.	If	we	have	to	eat	we	go	shoot	a	deer.	You	can’t	do	that	in	a	high	rise	in	Manhattan.	They’re	socialized	to	accept	government	gradually	taking	over	their	lives	(Mulloy,	2005,	p.	146).			Echoing	the	social	movements	cited	by	Purcell,	these	groups	could	be	interpreted	as	essentially	struggling	against	the	heteronomy	of	the	state.		Unlike	the	progressive	politics	envisioned	by	Purcell,	militia	movements	often	mobilize	for	morally	questionable	ends.	Among	many	complaints	against	the	government,	these	groups	object	to	the	way	lands	are	regulated	for	the	purposes	of	environmental	regulation	designed	to	combat	pollution	and	climate	change	(See:	Mulloy,	2005,	p.	148).	Militia	Movement	ideology	also	often	includes	an	aspect	of	racist	anti-immigrant	sentiment,	again	on	the	grounds	of	federal	government	and	globalist	tyranny	–	much	of	this	sentiment	now	present	in	the	so-called	alternative-right	movement.		Another	instructive	example	comes	from	the	predominantly	indigenous	rural	parts	of	the	Mexican	state	of	Oaxaca	where	governance	and	conflicts	are	resolved	by	what’s	called	‘traditions	and	customs’	(usos	y	costumbres)	(See:	Esteva,	2007).	Sometimes	touted	to	be	a	model	for	indigenous	justice	and	self-determination,	the	moral	consequences	have	not	always	been	favourable.	Case	in	point,	in	2016	an	eight-year-old	girl	was	allegedly	raped	by	a	55-year-old	local	pastor;	the	pastor	was	ultimately	found	guilty	by	the	local	community	tribunal.	In	accordance	with	the	system	based	on	traditions	and	customs,	the	pastor	was	ordered	to	buy	the	victim’s	father	two	cases	of	beer7.	The	system	was	supposed	to	respect	the	local	traditions																																																									6	See:	The	Hill,	July	1st,	2016,	http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/265062-militia-movement-growing-at-rapid-rate		7	See:	The	Guardian,	October	8th,	2016,	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/08/mexico-man-rape-girl-buy-beer-father	
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and	autonomy	of	a	diverse	indigenous	population	but	has	sometimes	lead	to	problematic	human	rights	abuses.	I	am	of	course	not	suggesting	such	results	are	an	inevitability,	but	only	that	these	kinds	of	outcomes	are	possible	when	we	privilege	autonomy	over	everything	else.				Finally,	in	2013	when	Purcell	endorsed	“blogging	networks	designed	to	provide	alternatives	to	corporate	media	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	90)”	as	a	sign	of	emerging	democracy,	he	could	not	have	known	the	negative	political	consequences.	Alternative	blogging	networks,	with	their	lack	of	centralized	editorial	standards,	have	been	identified	as	a	crucial	condition	in	the	rise	of	the	alternative	right	and	Donald	Trump,	exemplified	by	Breitbart,	fake	news,	etc.	As	philosopher	Kathleen	Higgens	observes,	we	have	reached	a	point	where	“the	public	hears	what	it	wants	to	hear,	because	many	people	get	their	news	exclusively	from	sources	whose	bias	they	agree	with	(Higgens,	2016)”.	Essentially	people	have	taken	control	of	their	own	truth	conditions,	leading	to	a	situation	where	there	is	no	longer	a	centrally	recognized	authority	for	what	counts	as	the	news	and	the	truth.	I	would	argue	that	this	is	analogous	to	the	danger	I	see	in	steadfastly	opposing	centralized	decision-making	(heteronomy),	where	we	see	a	‘siloing’	of	media	and	knowledge,	we	might	see	a	‘siloing’	of	political	and	social	outcome.	It	seems	reasonable	to	imagine	some	communities	holding	to	progressive	views,	while	others	becoming	regressive	and	racist	communities.		It	may	sound	as	though	I	think	people	cannot	be	trusted	to	do	the	right	thing	because	they	are	too	stupid	or	selfish.	While	this	will	be	discussed	at	length	when	I	explore	subjectivity	in	social	mobilization	in	chapter	4,	I	will	say	that	it	is	more	a	question	of	fundamental	human	weaknesses.	My	view	is	not	that	people	are	governed	by	selfishness,	or	are	incapable	of	understanding	complex	consequences.	Instead	it’s	that	people	are	limited	in	the	amount	of	considerations	they	can	engage	on	a	day-to-day	basis.	Because	of	this,	people	are	vulnerable	to	bias	and	poor	judgment,	and	I	worry	when	political	theories	do	not	take	seriously	the	question	of	correcting	for	this,	as	best	as	possible.		To	reiterate,	my	main	point	is	that	political	autonomy	will	necessarily	come	in	many	shades	of	ideology	and	outcome.	It	could	be	inclusive	or	exclusive,	
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progressive	or	regressive,	and	indeed,	morally	helpful	or	harmful.	The	way	social	mobilization	morally	condemns	heteronomy	writ	large	seems	to	be	in	line	with	a	common	mistake	in	thinking.	That	is,	because	heteronomy	can,	and	in	many	cases	has	led	to	morally	terrible	outcomes	must	mean	that	heteronomy	is	morally	terrible.	This	is	a	mistake	because	it	ignores	the	morally	relevant	circumstances	that	led	to	particular	outcomes.	It	would	be	like	saying	science	created	the	nuclear	bomb	therefore	science	is	evil.	The	problem	is	not	science	or	heteronomy	but	how	they	were	used.	This	is	also	why	I	am	not	morally	condemning	social	mobilization	but	instead	pointing	to	the	way	it	could	be	used	for	morally	negative	consequences.		I	would	argue	that	in	order	for	Friedmann	and	Purcell	to	be	conceptually	consistent,	they	must	accept	that	granting	people	equal	access	to	process	and	influence	in	the	decision-making	process	could	easily	(and	would	sometimes	likely)	lead	to	morally	negative	results.	Therefore,	returning	to	the	main	issue	in	question,	
it	is	not	clear	at	all,	based	on	the	above	considerations,	that	social	mobilization	is	likely	
to	lead	to	morally	better	outcomes.	Indeed,	there	is	reason	to	think	the	opposite	might	
be	true.	Based	on	this,	I	would	argue	that	we	must	have	primary	regard	for	outcomes	in	planning	theory,	with	certainly	some	regard	for	process.	But	we	must	pay	primary	attention	to	the	particular	morally	relevant	circumstances.			
The	Moral	Implications	
	In	the	above	pages,	I	argued	that	social	mobilization	is	not	an	inherently	morally	better	decision-making	process	in	planning	than	those	that	involve	different	degrees	of	heteronomy.	As	I	argued	above,	both	the	alienation	argument	and	the	socially	mobilized	outcomes	defense	failed	to	show	us	that	social	mobilization	is	morally	preferable.	In	the	case	of	the	alienation	argument,	I	considered	the	idea	that	social	mobilization	is	morally	preferable	because	it	actualizes	a	human-social	predisposition	toward	autonomous	control	of	the	social	conditions	of	life.	I	argued	in	contrast	that	something	being	a	predisposition	cannot	be	the	ground	for	deriving	moral	value,	and	even	if	it	could,	human	society	is	not	predisposed	to	autonomous	control	of	the	social	conditions	of	life.	If	anything,	it	seems	like	human	society	has	a	
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predisposition	toward	heteronomy.	The	second	way	I	considered	whether	social	mobilization	is	morally	better	was	to	argue	that	it	leads	to	morally	better	outcomes	in	planning	and	politics.	I	argued,	with	reference	to	NIMBYism	and	populist	social	movements,	that	there	are	just	as	many	reasons,	if	not	more,	suggesting	that	social	mobilization	could	lead	to	morally	negative	outcomes.	Specifically,	it	leaves	society	vulnerable	to	regressive	populism.			Despite	this,	it	is	possible	there	are	other	ways	of	arguing	that	social	mobilization	is	morally	preferable.	Perhaps	democracy	for	Purcell	(and	to	a	lesser	extent	Friedmann)	is	an	end,	in	and	of	itself,	the	importance	of	which	trounces	the	risk	of	possible	negative	outcomes.	Indeed,	there	are	reasons	for	reading	Purcell	as	thinking	the	risks	are	worth	the	rewards,	and	that	we	must	have	the	courage	to	step	into	unknown	consequences.	As	Purcell	puts	it,	“in	a	human	community	without	a	State,	we	are	capable	of	the	full	range	of	human	behaviors	and	relations…	we	are	not	fated	to	war.	Rather,	much	more	plausibly,	we	are	capable	of	anything	(Purcell,	2016,	p.	8,	my	emphasis)”.	It	seems	as	though	Purcell	is	fully	aware	of	the	risks,	yet	willing	to	take	a	‘leap	of	faith’,	regardless	of	the	potential	moral	consequences.	This	willingness	is,	I	suspect,	based	on	the	idea	that	radical	democracy	is	somehow	the	more	authentic	way	of	doing	things.	As	Richard	Rorty	describes	it,	it	is	a	view	that	argues	that	any	“movement	which	is	not	mass-based	must	somehow	be	a	fraud,	and	that	top-down	initiatives	are	automatically	suspect…	the	belief	that	there	is	virtue	only	among	the	oppressed	(Rorty,	1999,	p.	65)”.	It	is	an	attitude	indicative	of	a	kind	of	fundamentalist	purity	politics.	The	danger	of	which	is	that	when	confronted	with	problems	where	the	evidence	for	a	solution	is	overwhelming	(and	people	are	actually	dying,	as	in	the	case	of	harm	reduction),	we	argue	that	everyone	have	their	say,	even	if	that	say	is	contaminated	by	bias,	poor	judgment,	and	racism.	In	such	cases	I	want	a	centralized	authority	to	come	in	and	override	human	weakness,	when	moral	reasons	justify	it.	This	seems	especially	salient	in	the	context	of	global	climate	change,	where	the	stakes	are	likely	to	be	existential.			Finally,	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	social	mobilization	cannot	give	us	positive	results.	Indeed,	it	would	also	be	a	mistake	to	think	I	endorse	the	status	quo,	far	from	it.	Rather,	if	things	are	going	to	change	for	the	better	we	need	to	be	clear	on	
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potential	consequences.	It	is	irresponsible	to	dismiss	as	“mere	laziness”	real	questions	about	the	moral	impact	of	dismantling	central	political	and	administrative	institutions.	Certainly	we	need	to	build	more	responsive	governments	and	control	the	unjust	results	of	neoliberalism.	But	let’s	focus	on	ways	of	doing	just	that	by	make	use	of	the	existing	institutions	of	power	and	social	movements.	Surely,	social	movements	are	a	crucial	component	of	any	just	society;	I	just	don’t	think	there	is	any	reason	to	believe	the	answer	is	a	perpetual	state	of	social	mobilization.	We	need	to	avoid	falling	victim	to	the	purity	politics	trap	of	viewing	an	entire	way	of	doing	things	with	prima	facie	suspicion.	I	would	argue	that	the	truth	of	real	politics	is	that	they	are	messy,	and	impure.	I	echo	Rorty	when	he	calls	for	the	end	of	the		 idea	that	only	bottom-up	initiatives,	conducted	by	workers	and	peasants	who	have	somehow	been	freed	from	resentment	as	to	show	no	trace	of	prejudice,	can	achieve	our	country.	The	history	of	leftist	politics	in	America	is	a	story	of	how	top-down	initiatives	and	bottom-up	initiatives	have	interlocked	(Rorty,	1999,	p.	53).						
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Chapter	Three:	Subjectivity	in	Social	Mobilization	
	The	possibility	of	significant	social	and	political	change,	especially	change	precipitated	by	popular	bottom-up	activation,	is	to	a	meaningful	extent	dependent	on	how	subjectivity	functions.	The	question	is	this:	what	aspects	of	subjectivity	influence	the	possibility	of,	and	limits	on	social	and	political	change.	When	Friedmann	and	Purcell	write	about	political	theories	of	social	mobilization,	they	are	at	least	implying	a	view	of	how	subjectivity	can	become	socially	mobilized.	This	section	will	attempt	to	reconstruct	what	it	would	mean	to	be	a	socially	mobilized	subjectivity	in	accordance	with	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	theory.	I	will	argue	that	Friedmann	and	Purcell	are	committed	to	the	possibility	of	mass	perpetual	political	activity	and	resistance.	That	is,	a	population	that	can	overcome,	while	perhaps	not	completely,	at	least	significantly,	its	tendency	toward	subjective	passivity	(accepting	claim	2).		While	Friedmann	does	not	address	the	question	of	subjectivity	directly,	he	does	offer	us	an	account	of	what	a	socially	mobilized	society	might	look	like,	particularly	how	to	avoid	the	trap	of	centralized	rule.	In	contrast,	Purcell	directly	engages	the	question	of	subjectivity	by	critiquing	the	way	existing	institutions	of	power	coerce	the	population	into	a	state	of	subjective	passivity.	Moreover,	his	work	argues	for	the	importance	of	activating	subjectivity	from	its	state	of	passivity.	As	will	become	clear	later,	passivity/activity	is	an	important	conceptual	distinction	for	Purcell,	along	with	the	earlier	discussed	concepts	of	heteronomy/autonomy	and	oligarchy/democracy.	Importantly,	I	do	not	claim	that	either	theorist	is	implying	some	kind	of	utopian	end	state,	though	we	might	argue	that	Friedmann	is	open	to	the	possibility.	Instead	I	take	them	as	arguing	for	a	kind	of	perpetual	struggle.	However,	despite	not	reading	them	as	implying	a	utopian	end	state,	they	are	implying	something	crucial	about	subjectivity	in	arguing	for	a	perpetual	state	of	political	and	social	struggle.			 		
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Towards	a	Socially	Mobilized	Population	in	Friedmann	and	Purcell			When	Friedmann	offers	his	outline	of	“the	collective	self-production	of	life”,	he	is	describing	it	as	the	goal	of	social	mobilization.	Steps	necessary	for	the	collective	self-production	of	life	include,	“to	enhance	people’s	independent	critical	thinking	and	acting”,	“to	assert	people’s	sovereign	will	at	all	levels	of	territorial	life”,	and	“to	selectively	de-link	from	the	dominant	system	of	market	relations”	and	mass	media.	As	Friedmann	elaborates,	the	energy	to	generate	such	changes	must	come	from	within	“each	territorially	based	community	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	348)”.	Self-reliant	production	is	important	for	Friedmann	because	market	and	state	forces	are	argued	to	be	one	of	the	main	forces	preventing	a	truly	activated	political	community	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	347).	A	crucial	aspect	in	developing	a	socially	mobilized	population	is	resisting	centralized	leadership	and	power	structures.	This	is	why	one	of	the	key	roles	of	radical	planning	is	to	help	coordinate	action	in	a	way	that	resists	the	tendency	toward	centralized	decision-making	by	encouraging	collective	access	and	influence	for	all	members	of	the	community	(Friedmann,	1987,	pp.	305-306).			Friedmann	also	expresses	concern	for	the	way	the	mass	media	can	serve	to	‘brainwash’	the	population	in	a	way	that	limits	the	possibility	of	the	self-production	of	life	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	362).	This	is	why	it	is	crucial	for	households	to	begin	the	process	of	self-production	by	turning	outwards	to	other	households	undergoing	the	same	process.	That	is,	as	each	household	engages	in	self-production,	the	experiences,	resources,	and	skills	can	be	shared	to	other	households	in	an	effort	to	collectively	change	the	community,	and	then	by	extension,	the	larger	society	(Friedmann,	1987,	p.	362).	 	It	is	important	to	be	clear	that	for	Purcell,	the	goal	is	not	an	actually	existing	fully	democratic	society.	Instead,	the	idea	is	to	encourage	as	much	popular	bottom-up	socially	mobilized	struggle	as	possible.	The	main	goal	being	to	reclaim	as	much	ability	to	manage	conditions	collectively	and	autonomously	as	possible.	It	is	impossible,	according	to	Purcell,				
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to	ever	be	fully	autonomous.	The	political	imperative	can	only	ever	be	to	struggle	to	become	autonomous,	to	flee	heteronomy	and	move	toward	the	horizon	of	autonomy	to	the	extent	that	we	can	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	88).		This	admission	enables	Purcell	to	avoid	charges	of	utopianism,	since	his	political	vision	will	never	reach	completion.		While	admitting	that	there	can	never	be	a	perpetual	state	of	democracy,	Purcell	does	argue	that			 we	must	engage	in	a	perpetual	struggle	to	move	away	from	domination…	In	those	rare	instances	where	we	achieve	a	breakthrough,	we	must	continue	to	ward	off	the	re-formation	of	oligarchy	and	heteronomy	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	88).		Thus,	Purcell’s	theory,	instead	of	requiring	perpetual	democracy,	seems	to	require	perpetual	struggle	against	heteronomy,	toward	autonomy.		Purcell	does	put	a	lot	of	hope	in	achieving	a	kind	of	generalized	breakthrough	in	democracy.	This	is	exemplified	by	his	theoretical	disagreement	with	Jacques	Ranciere’s	political	theory.	For	Ranciere,	politics	exists	only	as	moments	when	what	he	calls	the	existing	‘police	order’	(the	structures	of	society,	the	laws,	customs,	habits,	traditions,	assumptions	and	morals)	is	disrupted,	interrupted,	and	called	into	question	at	a	fundamental	level,	usually	by	some	kind	of	social-political	uprisings.	The	result	of	such	a	moment	is	always	a	reconfiguration	of	the	existing	police	order	in	a	way	that	incorporates	demands	expressed	by	the	disruption	in	order.	After	this,	the	energy	of	the	initial	uprising	is	dissipated	(Ranciere,	2001).	Thus,	the	political	for	Ranciere	is	a	perpetual	series	of	disruptions	and	reconfigurations	taking	place	in	the	police	order.	This	also	means	that	there	is	no	escaping	the	police	order,	since	it	always	reconfigures	itself	in	a	way	that	re-pacifies	the	population,	until	the	next	disruption.		For	Purcell,	Ranciere’s	vision	of	politics	does	not	go	far	enough.	While	Purcell	agrees	that	a	state	of	perpetual	democracy	is	not	possible,	he	seems	committed	to	
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preserving	some	way	in	which	social	and	political	struggles	can	reach	a	breakthrough	state	of	perpetual	mobilization.	As	Purcell	puts	it,										 So	far	what	I	have	said…	aligns	with	Ranciere’s	democracy,	a	democracy	that	emerges,	that	may	make	a	difference	to	the	social	order,	but	then	relents	and	dissipates.	But	we	need	to	go	further	than	Ranciere	does…	we	should	press	for	a	breakthrough,	a	generalized	democratic	explosion	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	89).		Purcell’s	worry	is	likely	that	if	the	momentary	energy	dissipates	we	fall	back	into	passivity	such	that	the	socio-cultural	institutions	of	society	return	to	general	acceptance.		This	reveals	what	I	think	is	a	crucial	point	in	understanding	Purcell’s	view	of	democracy,	and	how	this	impacts	our	understanding	of	socially	mobilized	subjectivity.	Indeed,	what	Purcell’s	theory	seems	to	require	is	for	the	energy	associated	with	resistance	to	remain	active.	In	other	words,	the	subject	must	remain	in	a	state	of	mobilized	activity.	In	contrast,	Ranciere	seems	to	think	true	moments	of	political	mobilization	are	only	possible	as	momentary	disruptions.	This	is	not	good	enough	for	Friedmann	and	Purcell	since	both	emphasize	generalized	and	permanent	socially	mobilized	action.	Action	that	constantly	resists	capital,	mass	media	culture,	and	leadership	structures	since	these	lead	to	passivity	and	heteronomy.	Ranciere’s	view	of	democracy	is	problematic	for	Purcell	because	it	accepts	a	certain	level	of	inescapable	passivity	in	political	subjectivity.		
Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity:	Activity	and	Passivity		The	task	remains	to	isolate	the	crucial	aspects	of	active	subjectivity,	the	absence	of	which	would	render	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	social	mobilization	view	of	democracy	implausible.	I	will	argue,	following	Purcell,	that	the	essential	concept	in	socially	mobilized	subjectivity	is	the	distinction	between	active	and	passive.	I	argue	that	for	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	theory	to	make	sense,	a	high	level	of	subjective	activity	is	
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required.	To	see	how	this	is	the	case,	we	need	to	get	clearer	on	what	is	meant	by	subjective	activity	as	it	relates	to	social	mobilization.			 One	of	Purcell’s	central	concerns	is	to	explain	how	it	is	that	so	much	of	the	populace	remains	politically	passive.	Political	passivity	is	the	idea	that	most	people	do	not	question	the	customs	and	institutions	of	centralized	and	cultural	power	(Ranciere’s	“police	order”).	In	other	words,	people	allow	the	decision-making	process	to	happen	in	a	heteronomous	manner,	and	seem	to	prefer	being	ruled	by	others.	Indeed,	according	to	Purcell	there	exists	a	deep	subjective	tendency	toward	“inertia,	inactivity,	passivity,	to	have	someone	else	make	decisions	for	us	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	93)”.	The	connection	between	subjective	passivity	and	heteronomy	is	now	evident.	Subjective	passivity	to	allow	others	(institutions	or	rulers)	to	make	decisions	for	us	is	heteronomy,	since	through	political	passivity	decisions	get	made	external	to	collective	will.	Like	Friedmann,	Purcell	blames	this	tendency	toward	passivity	on	the	governments,	institutions,	and	mass	media	for	effectively	brainwashing	the	populace	with	ideas	including	that	the	state			 is	identical	to	the	public,	that	it	exists	only	to	serve	our	interests,	that	we	would	descend	into	chaos	without	it.	Apple	actively	cajoles	us	into	believing	we	cannot	survive	without	an	iPad.	The	whole	complex	of	strategies...	[works]	to	keep	us	passive,	consuming,	and	governed	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	94).					While	a	lot	of	blame	can	be	placed	on	the	above	influences,	Purcell	admits	that	such	influences	only	work	because	we	already	have	a	desire	to	be	ruled.	Indeed,	this	is	why	the	project	of	democracy	“isn’t	so	much	the	project	to	confront	a	power	wielded	by	malevolent	forces	beyond	our	control.	Rather,	democracy	is	a	struggle	against	our	own	desire	for	oligarchy”	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	93).	Therefore,	subjectivity	involved	in	social	mobilization	must	be	capable	of	overcoming	its	desire	to	be	passively	ruled.		 Overcoming	this	desire	to	be	ruled,	according	to	Purcell,	requires	cultivating	a	desire	and	faculty	for	political	activity.	This	is	a	faculty	that	Purcell	claims	has	lacked	appropriate	exercise	in	liberal-democratic	culture	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	95).	To	
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finally	overcome	the	tendency	for	passivity	requires	a	painful	struggle.	To	illustrate	this	point,	Purcell	appeals	to	David	Foster	Wallace’s	writings	where	he	uses	drug	addiction	as	a	metaphor	for	the	temptation	of	passivity.	He	describes	two	scenarios,	the	first	depicts	spectators	in	a	near	future	where	an	“entertainment”	becomes	so	compelling	it	lulls	people	into	a	perpetual	infantile	and	catatonic	state	of	passivity,	so	much	so	that	they	die	of	dehydration.	The	other	scenario	describes	an	addict‘s			 efforts	to	ward	off	“the	substance”	to	remain	clean	and	avoid	returning	to	a	hellish	life	of	addiction…	they	must	actively	struggle	to	retain	control	of	themselves,	to	manage	their	destructive	desires.	If	they	fail	in	their	struggle,	the	will	surely	die	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	103).		In	this	rather	dramatic	use	of	metaphor,	Purcell	is	telling	us	that	the	struggle	for	democratic	activity	amounts	to	a	struggle	to	live.	No	doubt	this	is	meant	to	show	how	difficult	becoming	truly	democratic	is.			 While	Purcell	does	not	downplay	the	difficulty	associated	with	subjective	activity,	he	does	see	a	hopeful	side	of	the	struggle.	Quoting	Lefebvre,	Purcull	argues	that	even	though			 autonomous	activity	requires	“painful	effort,”…	[Lefebvre]	is	quick	to	add	that	it	also	offers	“the	joy	of	creation,”	a	feeling	of	deep	delight	that	so	often	comes	when	we	achieve	a	task	through	a	concerted	effort	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	109).		Thus	the	claim	is	that	exercising	our	democratic	faculties	will	lead	to	a	joy	related	to	creativity.	The	perpetual	struggle	to	be	active,	according	to	Purcell,	is	analogous	with	maturing	into	an	adult	that	takes	responsibility.	The	temptation	to	be	passive	is	the	desire	for	a	paternal	figure	to	take	care	of	our	conditions.	To	become	full	adult	subjects,	we	must	commence	the	project	of	overcoming	in	order	to	control	our	own	conditions	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	107).			
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Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity:	Resisting	Passivity		 	Based	on	what	Purcell	has	described	with	regard	to	becoming	active,	as	well	as	the	type	of	society	Friedmann	envisions,	I	want	to	argue	that	socially	mobilized	subjectivity	relies	on	the	possibility	of	a	continuous	and	reasonably	consistent	attitude	of	overcoming	the	tendency	toward	passive	subjectivity.	That	is,	the	subject	of	active	social	mobilization	is	one	that	needs	to	continually	question	its	concrete	conditions	as	will	as	the	conditions	of	its	own	thinking.	Without	such	questioning	it	is	likely	to	fall	into	passivity	in	a	way	that	prevents	the	kind	of	struggle	for	democracy	expressed	by	Purcell,	and	implied	by	Friedmann.			 What	I	mean	by	the	subjective	questioning	of	concrete	conditions,	is	that	the	subject	must	attempt	to	consider	the	way	in	which	the	conditions	of	life	are	produced,	controlled,	and	decided	upon.	As	an	example,	for	me	to	be	truly	striving	for	democracy	in	Purcell	and	Friedmann’s	sense	I	need	to	be	critical	and	aware	of	how	I	get	hydropower,	for	example.	The	same	could	be	said	for	where	my	food	comes	from,	where	I	go	shopping,	etc.	If	I	do	not	strive	to	question	these	material	conditions	I	am	not	truly	striving	for	democracy.	Simply	allowing	these	conditions	to	remain	unquestioned	is	to	allow	someone	else	to	make	those	decisions	for	me,	and	fall	victim	to	heteronomy.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	I	may	not	succeed	in	understanding	the	intricacies	of	the	material	conditions	around	me,	but	to	be	struggling	for	democracy	means	I	at	least	need	to	try.	The	moment	I	get	comfortable	with	my	material	conditions	is	likely	the	moment	I	am	no	longer	striving	for	democracy.				 Questioning	the	conditions	of	my	own	thinking	is	connected	to	taking	responsibility	for	myself.	I	must	own	the	way	I	think,	and	as	Friedmann	argued,	I	must	cultivate	strong	independent	critical	thinking	skills.	Assumptions	we	might	have	about	ethics	and	humanity	for	example	are	just	other	ways	of	being	passive	and	not	taking	responsibility	for	how	we	think	and	treat	each	other.	To	use	Ranciere’s	term,	it	is	to	blindly	accept	the	‘police	order’.	To	be	truly	democratic	then,	is	to	always	be	questioning	your	own	ethical	intuitions	by	asking,	“have	I	really	done	
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enough?”	The	only	correct	answer	in	a	struggle	for	true	democracy	is	“no”.	Mobilized	activity	must	continue	its	effort	to	overcome	passivity	and	heteronomy.				 Activity,	as	opposed	to	passivity,	is	essentially	resisting	the	comfort	associated	with	accepting	the	given	socio-political	situation.	If	we	recall	from	Purcell’s	critique	of	Ranciere,	moments	of	social	mobilization	are	not	enough,	because	the	goal	of	the	true	democrat	is	a	‘generalized	breakthrough’	where	all	“insistently	push	out	further	toward	activity,	awareness,	and	democracy,	radically	so	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	121)”.	Therefore,	the	project	is	to	win	a	breakthrough	where	socially	mobilized	struggle,	and	where	subjects	strive	for	active	resistance,	is	generalized	in	the	population.	Based	on	my	reading	of	Purcell	and	Friedmann,	without	the	above-described	features	of	subjectivity,	their	political	theories	are	not	plausible.	Because	Purcell	has	set	up	passivity	as	the	enemy	of	democracy,	my	description	of	an	active	subject	seems	essential	if	perpetual	struggle	is	to	succeed.	Consider	the	subject	that	does	not	continually	consider	its	material	conditions,	or	the	conditions	of	its	thinking.	Following	Purcell’s	logic,	this	would	open	the	door	to	passivity,	heteronomy,	and	oligarchy.	For	Friedmann,	though	he	does	not	explicitly	discuss	passivity	and	activity,	his	description	of	the	self-production	of	life	seems	to	imply	the	need	for	a	similar	kind	of	subjectivity.	Indeed,	he	describes	the	need	for	resistance	to	leadership,	independent	critical	thinking,	and	the	collective	self-management	of	conditions.	For	this	reason	I	would	also	claim	Friedmann’s	view	fits	my	concept	of	socially	mobilized	subjectivity	as	perpetual	resistance	to	passivity.			
Conclusion		In	the	above	chapter	I	explored	what	it	means	to	be	a	socially	mobilized	subject.	I	argued	that	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	theories	rely	on	a	subjectivity	that	perpetually	resists	the	passivity	involved	in	accepting	its	conditions	through	a	perpetual	questioning	of	both	its	material	conditions,	and	the	conditions	of	its	thinking.	Without	these	features,	the	socially	mobilized	subject	risks	falling	into	passivity,	heteronomy,	and	oligarchy.	Because	of	this	I	argue	that	Friedmann	and	Purcell	are	indeed	committed	to	claim	2.	Their	views	rely	on	a	subject	capable	of	overcoming,	
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while	perhaps	not	completely,	at	least	significantly,	its	tendency	toward	passivity	as	described	by	Purcell,	and	implied	by	Friedmann.	Therefore,	the	next	chapter	will	consider	whether	this	view	of	subjectivity	is	plausible.								
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Chapter	Four:	Phenomenology	and	The	Limits	of	Socially	Mobilized	
Subjectivity		 The	act	of	becoming	aware	and	becoming	active	is	therefore	only	a	first	step…	the	second	step	must	be	to	fight	like	hell…	we	must	fight	to	stay	active,	to	ward	off	our	desire	for	heteronomy	and	oligarchy,	and	to	reaffirm	our	desire	for	autonomy	and	democracy	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	119).	
	
Introduction	
	The	above	is	a	powerful	sentiment,	the	kind	of	message	we	might	want	to	rally	around.	However,	is	this	kind	of	struggle	possible	on	a	consistent	basis?	That	is,	is	it	realistic,	or	even	possible	to	ward	off	passivity?	In	this	chapter	I	will	endeavor	to	answer	this	question	by	drawing	on	a	phenomenological	account	of	subjectivity.	This	will	involve	considering	the	requirements	previously	set	for	socially	mobilized	subjectivity.	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty’s	existential	phenomenology	offers	us	valuable	insights	that	problematize	the	passive/active	distinction	and	forces	us	to	reconsider	certain	assumptions	about	subjectivity	that	I	will	argue	are	included	in	socially	mobilized	subjectivity.		
Objective	Thought	and	Merleau-Ponty		It	is	useful	to	begin	by	briefly	explaining	phenomenology	as	a	method	of	philosophical	inquiry.	Phenomenology	is	essentially	a	study	of	the	structural	features	of	experience,	as	they	are	perceived	(J.	Smith,	2017).	This	amounts	to	a	philosophy	that	is	highly	descriptive	of	the	phenomena	of	experience.		 In	Phenomenology	of	Perception,	Merleau-Ponty	problematizes	an	idea	about	perception	he	calls	‘objective	thought’.	Objective	thought	is	the	name	Merleau-Ponty	uses	to	describe	a	certain	way	of	describing	the	subject’s	relationship	with	perception	and	the	world	(See:	Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	pp.	69-74;	Dreyfus,	2002,	p.	378).	As	Lawrence	Hass	puts,	objective	thought	is		
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The	view	that	external	material	objects	activate	one’s	sense	organs,	which	cause	sensations	in	one’s	mind	or	brain,	which	in	turn	the	understanding	compiles	or	“internally	represents”	as	perceived	objects	such	as	a	table	and	chairs	(Hass,	2008,	p.	29).		According	to	objective	thought,	we	operate	in	the	world	by	developing	certain	mental	representations	of	perceived	sense	datum.	For	example,	according	to	objective	thought	the	reason	I	perceive	a	chair	as	something	to	sit	in	is	because	I	have	learned	to	develop	the	concept	of	chair	as	a	mental	representation	in	my	head,	and	corresponding	conceptual	content	pointing	to	its	usefulness.	The	idea	being	that	I	recognize	the	chair	because	I	have	the	concept	of	chair	in	mind	and	I	can	compare	my	perception	to	my	mental	representation	of	chair,	and	then	recognize	it.	Therefore,	for	objective	thought,	mental	representations	function	to	bridge	the	divide	between	perceiver	and	perceived	world,	and	allow	the	subject	to	function	in	the	world.	Thus,	the	subject	relies	on	developing	mental	representations	that	accurately	reflect	objects	perceived	in	sense	datum	(Dreyfus,	2002,	p.	377).		One	of	the	implications	of	this	view	is	that	it	essentially	accepts	the	idea	that	the	world	and	the	subject	perceiving	that	world	are	separated.	Another	way	of	thinking	about	this	is	to	imagine	that	you	have	the	world	on	the	one	hand,	functioning	as	sense	datum.	And	you	have	the	‘thinking	subject’	on	the	other	hand,	actively	receiving	and	interpreting	the	perceived	world.	The	crucial	point	to	notice	here	is	the	primacy	these	views	place	on	the	‘thinking	subject’.	By	thinking	subject	I	mean	that	the	primary	mode	of	being	for	the	subject	on	this	view	is	that	it	thinks,	it	is	always	interpreting	its	perceptions,	and	building	mental	representations	to	better	operate	in	that	world.	Put	another	way,	on	this	view	the	subject	spends	its	time	consciously	aware	of	its	desires,	and	its	actions.	The	thinking	subject,	by	and	large,	holds	its	desire	and	action	in	the	foreground	of	awareness.		An	important	point	to	flag	is	that	this	view	of	subjectivity	affords	the	subject	a	significant	amount	of	control	and	autonomy.	This	is	because	mental	representations	are	by	their	nature	actively	grasped	and	judged	by	us.	On	this	view,	the	thinking	subject	is	always	actively	aware	of	the	mental	representations	that	make	sense	of	the	perceptual	world.	Not	being	actively	aware	of	the	conditions	of	its	
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actions	and	desires	would	necessarily	reduce	subjective	control.	In	other	words,	active	awareness	is	a	necessary	step	for	having	autonomy.		
Social	Mobilization	and	the	‘Thinking	Subject’	
	I	want	to	make	the	claim	that	social	mobilization	views	like	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	accept	a	version	of	‘objective	thought’	in	their	implied	accounts	of	subjectivity.	Such	views	essentially	argue	that	the	reason	people	are	not	socially	mobilizing	is	because	they	do	not	have	the	right	kind	of	mental	representations	in	their	minds,	the	kind	that	would	allow	for	sustained	coordinated	resistance.	This	is	why	Friedmann	and	Purcell	spend	so	much	time	talking	about	people	becoming	aware	of	their	conditions,	and	realize	how	they	are	being	manipulated	into	passivity	by	vacuous	desires	in	media	and	neoliberal	culture.	Indeed,	social	mobilizations	requirement	to	constantly	question	our	material	conditions	and	the	conditions	of	our	thinking	is	to	render	them	into	continually	graspable	mental	representations.		Purcell	explains	the	lack	of	active	political	resistance	partially	by	ascribing	a	
desire	to	be	passive.	This	desire	supposedly	comes	from	the	idea	that	people	would	rather	let	others	take	care	of	them,	a	desire	to	regress	to	an	infant	state.	To	overcome	this	requires	that	people	cultivate	a	new	desire	to	be	active,	to	realize	that	the	desire	for	passivity	is	mistaken	and	the	result	of	manipulation,	and	that	being	active	is	actually	in	our	best	interest.	The	key	point	here	is	that	such	desires	for	passivity	are	still	the	kind	of	thing	that	can	at	least	be	partially	overcome	by	becoming	aware.	In	other	words,	political	action	depends	on	the	right	kinds	of	collective	beliefs	(mental	representations).	In	a	way,	political	passivity	is	reduced	to	a	failure	to	think	properly,	to	realize	what	is	in	our	interest.	This	account,	I	would	argue,	is	consistent	with	subjectivity	as	privileging	the	actively	‘thinking	subject’,	a	subject	that	acts	on	beliefs	and	mental	representations.		In	the	next	few	pages,	I	will	explain	how	Merleau-Ponty	makes	this	entire	view	of	the	thinking	subject	problematic.	What	Merleau-Ponty	argues	in	
Phenomenology	of	Perception	is	that	the	subject	of	perception	relies	much	less	on	conscious	mental	representations,	and	is	more	intertwined	with	the	world	it	
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perceives.	Indeed,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	the	subject	takes	a	much	more	passive	role	in	perception	and	engagement	with	the	world.		 	
The	Habit-Body	and	Non-Representational	Passive	Perception			According	to	Merleau-Ponty,	subjectivity	does	not	act	primarily	on	beliefs	or	mental	representations,	but	rather	on	the	basis	of	embodied	habituation.	As	we	can	recall,	objective	thought	argues	that	actions	in	the	world	depend	on	conscious	mental	representations	of	objects	and	ideas	in	the	world.	For	example,	walking	to	a	window	and	opening	it	depends	on	mental	representational	content	that	allows	us	to	recognize	the	windows.	To	be	sure,	Merleau-Ponty	does	not	deny	that	we	can	have	mental	representations,	such	as	windows	and	chairs.	Rather,	he	argues	that	mental	representations	are	rarely	involved	in	everyday	actions.	Actions	are	normally	accomplished	because	our	bodies	have	become	attuned	with	certain	habits	of	movement	and	passive	sensitivities	to	particular	contexts	(See:	Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	pp.	143-148).			The	best	way	to	explain	Merleau-Ponty’s	view	of	the	habit-body	is	to	analyze	skill	acquisition.	Consider	already	acquired	skills.	For	example,	when	I	tie	my	shoes	I	am	not	thinking	about	each	movement	of	my	fingers,	comparing	it	with	a	representation	of	how	shoes	should	be	tied.	When	I	drive	I	do	not	concentrate	on	the	movements	in	my	feet	by	calculating	the	amount	of	pressure	needed	to	accomplish	my	task.	On	the	contrary,	the	above	best	describes	the	experience	of	trying	to	learn	a	new	task.	Indeed,	consider	the	perceptual	difference	between	driving	for	the	first	time,	and	driving	now.	In	the	first	instance	I	am	clumsy,	my	movements	are	inconsistent	and	overly	deliberate.	I	have	to	think	carefully	about	each	movement	in	a	way	that	almost	prevents	me	from	doing	anything.	Most	experienced	drivers	can	likely	recall	being	on	‘autopilot’,	only	to	arrive	at	their	destination	with	almost	no	memory	of	the	journey.	Similar	experiences	can	likely	be	recalled	in	cases	of	walking	a	familiar	route	through	a	neighborhood.	Also,	consider	typing	on	a	keyboard.	Typing	quickly	and	effectively	depends	almost	on	not	thinking	about	the	movements	of	your	fingers	and	just	allowing	your	body	to	do	the	work	for	
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you.	We	develop	the	above-mentioned	skills	not	by	thinking	and	developing	a	mental	representation,	but	by	exposing	our	bodies	to	repeated	situations	and	movements.	Acquiring	skills	and	habits	in	this	way	results	in	an	alteration	of	the	way	perceptions	appear	for	us	(See:	Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	pp.	153-155).	This	is	an	important	point.	The	result	of	habituation	is	that	all	perceptions	come	with	built	in	values	and	claims,	many	of	them	related	to	opportunities	and	demands	for	action.	That	is,	everyday	perceptions	point	our	attention	towards	certain	aspects,	and	lead	us	to	ignore	others.	These	experiences	appear	in	perception	not	as	the	result	of	conscious	judgment,	but	are	passive	responses	resulting	from	embodied	habituation.	I	see	the	traffic	light	turn	red	and	the	perception	is	a	prohibition	on	certain	actions.	Before	I	can	reflect	on	the	idea	of	red	light	as	a	concept,	my	body	becomes	passively	sensitive	to	the	situation	and	responds	by	pressing	the	breaks.	Consider	an	experienced	hockey	player.	The	player	does	not	see	the	lines	on	the	rink	as	simply	colored	lines,	but	rather	perceives	them	as	actual	opportunities	and	limits	on	action	within	their	context.	The	hockey	puck	is	not	simply	a	black	disk,	but	rather,	it	becomes	–	as	a	result	of	the	player’s	involvement	–	a	puck	to-be-intercepted,	and	to-be-shot	into	the	opposing	teams	net.	Conscious	judgment	and	conceptual	thinking	play	only	a	minor	role	in	such	situations	with	the	primary	mode	being	passive	sensitivities	to	the	context	resulting	from	embodied	habituation.	Imagine	the	alternate	scenario,	one	where	each	time	the	hockey	player	encountered	the	blue	line,	they	would	have	to	accomplish	a	mental	inference	to	remember	what	role	it	plays.	In	such	a	circumstance	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	successful	skillfulness.	Considering	other	examples,	the	difference	between	how	a	skilled	climber	and	a	novice	climber	perceive	a	steep	rock	face	is	instructive.	Whereas	the	skilled	climber	will	perceive	the	textured	rock	face	as	containing	several	opportunities	for	climbing,	the	novice	may	only	see	an	impassable	rock	wall.	Moreover,	imagine	watching	a	movie	that	is	supposed	to	be	set	in	a	pacific	northwestern	forest	but	was	actually	filmed	in	the	Appalachia.	Most	of	us	would	never	notice.	However,	for	an	experienced	botanist	the	fact	that	certain	species	of	tree	or	plant	does	not	belong	would	likely	jump	out	at	them.	Both	the	botanist	and	non-botanist	are	viewing	the	
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same	visual	stimuli	however	for	the	botanist,	due	to	their	training	(habit),	different	details	are	called	forth.	These	examples	support	Merleau-Ponty’s	claim	that	our	primary	mode	of	being	in	the	world	is	through	a	process	of	being	exposed	and	exposing	ourselves	to	movements	and	situations	to	the	point	that	our	bodies	reconfigure	themselves	to	perceive	appropriately	in	the	given	situation	(what	Herbert	Dreyfus	calls	‘absorbed	coping’	(Dreyfus,	2002,	p.	378)).	Unlike	traditional	philosophical	views	that	imply	a	mind-body	dualism,	Merleau-Ponty’s	view	emphasizes	the	role	that	the	body	plays	in	subjectivity.	Indeed,	the	body	is	our	ontology.	For	Merleau-Ponty,	habit	is	a	crucial	ontological	feature.		If	we	consider	the	world	the	subject	is	born	into,	depending	on	the	culture	it	finds	itself	in,	certain	cultural	customs	function	like	embodied	habits	and	become	part	of	perceptual	reality.	There	are	always	already	passively	experienced	action	and	value-laden	perceptions	of	the	world.	Seeing	two	people	walking	down	the	street	holding	hands	points	to	the	claim	that	they	are	a	romantic	couple	(and	ignores	other	possibilities).	Again,	there	is	no	conscious	inference	or	mental	representation	in	these	experiences,	the	perception	simply	shows	up	as	such.	Just	like	the	acquisition	of	skills	of	movement,	this	perceptual	directionality	is	experienced	passively	as	a	result	of	the	subject	coping	with	the	milieu	of	contingent	social	signifiers	and	customs	(Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	p.	363).	For	Merleau-Ponty,	the	subject	is	always	already	coping	with	a	world	of	values	and	practices	that	determine	certain	passive	contextual	sensitivities.	Consider	the	alternative	scenario,	one	in	which	perceptions	showed	up	as	requiring	continual	judgment,	where	perceptions	never	showed	up	as	demanding	action	or	announcing	meaning,	and	where	such	truths	required	active	inference	–	this	in	no	way	resembles	the	world	we	live	in.	To	be	sure,	human	subjectivity	does	involve	reflective	conceptual	representations.	What	Merleau-Ponty	reveals	is	that	they	are	involved	far	less	often	than	people	may	think.	In	a	way,	reflective	thought	is	an	interruption	in	our	day-to-day	movements	and	practices.	Most	of	the	time	we	are	absorbed	into	our	tasks	and	routines.	Critical	thought	is	perhaps	a	way	of	lifting	ourselves	out	of	our	situation	to	question	our	routines	and	habits.	However,	as	I	will	argue,	based	on	the	nature	of	
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the	subject	as	habit-body	it	makes	no	practical	sense	to	argue	for	a	perpetual	state	of	active	critical	reflection	and	resistance.			
The	Habit-Body	and	Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity		Why	is	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	subjectivity	as	the	habit-body	relevant	to	socially	mobilized	subjectivity?	Purcell’s	social	mobilization	makes	passivity	and	heteronomy	the	enemy	of	democracy.	Indeed,	Purcell	argues	that	the	true	democrat	is	someone	who	endeavors	to	be	in	a	perpetual	state	of	active	resistance	against	heteronomy	and	passivity.	However,	as	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	reveals,	passivity	and	heteronomy	play	a	crucial	role	in	subjectivity.	Indeed,	to	be	able	to	function	in	the	world	is	to	surrender	some	activity	and	autonomy	to	habitual	perception	and	action.	We	must	let	the	world	and	our	situation	influence	our	body	if	we	are	to	function	successfully	in	the	world.		 Perhaps	it	is	possible	to	argue	that	we	need	to	encourage	the	habit	of	active	resistance.	Surely,	developing	new	habits	can	be	a	positive	worthwhile	endeavor.	However,	turning	active	resistance	into	a	habit	would	be	a	category	mistake.	What	I	mean	is,	to	be	habituated	is	to	develop	a	certain	way	of	perceiving	the	world	that	ignores	other	ways	of	perceiving	it,	thus	eliminating	some	critical	nuance.	As	demonstrated	in	the	above	example,	when	you	see	two	people	walking	down	the	street	holding	hands	the	perception	just	assumes	a	couple,	and	ignores	other	possibilities.	It	shows	up	as	if	given	to	you.	To	pull	oneself	out	of	that	given	perception	and	question	it	is	to	transcend	the	habitual	response.	Thus,	to	think	we	might	make	a	habit	out	of	questioning	habitual	givens	is	to	misunderstand	habit.	Or,	in	other	words,	you	cannot	make	a	habit	of	avoiding	habits.			Attempting	to	question	given	perceptions	is	certainly	a	worthy	exercise.	The	problem	I	am	pointing	toward	is	not	with	the	idea	of	questioning	our	perceptions,	but	with	building	an	entire	political	theory	around	the	idea	that	passivity	and	heteronomy	are	somehow	the	enemy	of	justice	and	democracy.	In	a	way	we	are	creatures	of	heteronomy	and	habit.	It	is	ironic	that	Purcell	uses	drug	addiction	as	an	analogy	for	the	democratic	struggle	against	heteronomy.	Indeed,	as	Purcell	put	it,	
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struggling	to	resist	the	‘substance’	of	addiction	because	it	will	kill	you	is	essentially	the	same	justification	for	resisting	oligarchy.	The	reason	this	is	ironic	is	because	of	how	clearly	frivolous	‘the	war	on	drugs’	has	been,	and	how	successful	harm	reduction	treatments	involving	controlled	doses	of	illegal	drugs	has	been.	Thus,	escaping	the	drug	completely	may	not	be	necessary,	and	the	‘war	on	passivity’	as	hopeless	as	the	way	on	drugs.	Indeed,	there	is	considerable	emerging	research	that	argues	that	addiction	has	little	to	do	with	the	substance	itself,	and	more	to	do	with	how	people	use	it	in	their	given	social	and	psychological	context	(Alexander,	2010).	I	would	argue	that	the	same	is	true	with	heteronomy,	not	only	is	it	likely	impossible	to	resist,	but	it	is	also	valuable	for	functioning	subjectivity	(and	political	society).	Indeed,	the	fact	that	when	we	learn	a	skill	it	becomes	almost	automatic	is	the	thing	that	makes	skillfulness	so	useful.		The	truth	of	subjectivity	is	much	more	complicated	than	social	mobilization	seems	to	suggest.	It	is	a	little	bit	too	easy	to	proclaim	‘down	with	heteronomy	and	passivity!’	The	truth	about	the	conditions	that	lead	to	political	action,	resistance,	and	change,	is	that	it	is	a	messy	mixed-up	affair.	As	Merleau-Ponty	aptly	describes,		 Our	freedom,	it	is	said,	is	either	total	or	non-existent.	This	is	a	dilemma	of	objective	thought…	We	are	mixed	up	with	the	world	and	others	in	an	inextricable	confusion.	The	idea	of	a	situation	precludes	there	being	an	absolute	freedom	at	the	origin	of	our	commitments	and,	for	that	matter,	at	their	end.	No	commitment…	can	cause	me	to	transcend	all	differences	and	render	me	free	for	anything	(Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	p.	481).				Indeed,	we	cannot	build	our	hopes	on	transcending	our	conditions	through	radical	freedom.	Our	context,	including	perceptual	habits,	defines	our	possible	actions.	In	this	way	the	landscape	of	possible	political	actions	is	always	in	some	way	given	by	other	conditions,	and	thus	inescapably	contaminated	by	heteronomy.		
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Habits	of	Politics,	The	Politics	of	Habit:	Phenomenological	Lessons		
	As	someone	who	wants	to	see	meaningful	progressive	social	and	political	change	in	planning,	I	think	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	offers	useful	lessons	about	how	change	might	happen,	and	the	limits	on	that	change.	When	it	comes	to	limits	on	political	change	we	need	only	observe	many	activists	movements.	Part	of	the	problem,	I	would	argue,	is	a	continued	belief	in	the	primacy	of	the	thinking	subject.	That	is,	we	tend	to	believe	our	perceptions	of	the	world	are	accurate	and	not	influenced	by	habits	of	perception.	This	is	evident	if	we	observe	radical	activist	movements	that	purport	to	be	resisting	conditions	of	injustice.	While	most	of	these	activist	groups	begin	with	legitimate	grievances,	and	true	observations,	what	tends	to	happen	is	loss	of	nuance.	Indeed,	what	is	easily	detectable	in	most	activist	movements	is	the	emergence	of	a	kind	of	fundamentalist	consciousness.	Everything	becomes	explainable	by	the	one	injustice	a	given	activist	group	is	fighting	against.	Whether	a	movement	is	on	the	cultural	right,	where	the	grievance	might	be	too	many	immigrants,	or	on	the	cultural	left,	where	the	grievance	might	be	colonialism	and	racism,	the	‘truth’	tends	to	become	a	totalizing	explanation	for	all	injustices.			 Considering	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology,	it	shouldn’t	be	surprising	that	when	people	expose	themselves	to	a	certain	kind	of	social	milieu	they	begin	to	develop	a	corresponding	perceptual	habit.	Indeed,	the	perceived	world	has	effectively	changed	for	people	involved	in	such	movements.	The	habit-body	compels	them	to	notice	certain	details	while	ignoring	others	(a	non-intellectualized	way	of	describing	confirmation	bias).	Just	like	the	botanist	whose	training	compelled	them	to	notice	certain	vegetation,	people	involved	in	political	activism	are	training	themselves	to	perceive	in	a	specific	way,	for	better	or	worse.	The	important	lesson	here	is	to	stop	reducing	people’s	political	beliefs	to	beliefs	at	all.	Habituation	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	view	runs	much	deeper	than	belief.	The	world	literally	presents	itself	passively	to	the	subject	in	a	way	that	is	suggestive	of	their	context.	The	mistake	is	made	when	we	are	too	confident	in	our	ability	to	be	a	thinking	subject,	and	not	open	to	our	vulnerability	as	habit-bodies.	Activists	and	other	political	ideologues	believe	they	are	seeing	clearly	because	they	believe	they	are	a	thinking	subject	that	
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has	uncovered	a	unifying	truth.	However,	Merleau-Ponty	shows	us	that	this	is	far	from	the	case.	The	problem	with	Purcell’s	radical	democratic	politics	is	that	it	reduces	injustice	to	heteronomy.	The	fact	that	we	do	not	have	absolute	control	of	our	conditions	seems	to	be	the	only	concern	for	Purcell.	Purcell’s	faith	in	our	ability	to	‘fight	like	hell’	and	resist	heteronomy	and	passivity	is	I	think	demonstrative	of	his	belief	in	the	thinking	subject	as	primary	mode	of	being.								 Another	important	lesson	offered	by	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	is	that	it	offers	a	plausible	explanation	for	how	and	why	social	and	political	change	either	happens	or	doesn’t.	Once	we	understand	subjectivity	as	habit-body,	we	realize	that	political	disagreements	are	more	than	intellectual	disagreements.	People	actually	perceive	the	world	in	a	certain	way	based	on	passive	sensitivities	to	certain	contexts,	and	it	takes	tremendous	effort	to	overcome.	People	often	do	not	accept	contrary	evidence	presented	to	them	because	of	how	they	have	developed	perceptual	habits.	There	are	affective	attachments	associated	with	the	ways	people	perceive	their	world	and	it	is	beyond	a	mere	intellectual	task	to	overcome	this.	This	is	also	why	NIMBYism	is	so	prevalent	in	planning.	People,	because	of	their	subjectivity	as	habit-body,	fight	to	stay	in	the	comfort	of	their	existing	perceptual	milieu.	It	takes	more	than	just	arguments	that	appeal	to	people’s	interest	to	foster	political	change.	Sometimes,	dare	I	say	it;	it	needs	to	be	forced	on	them,	if	the	moral	context	demands	it.			
The	Practical	Implications:	Habit	as	Necessity		 The	problem	is,	how	to	do	it	when	things	return	to	normal,	when	people	get	tired	of	being	permanently	mobilized8			 -	Slavoj	Žižek		I	want	to	conclude	by	considering	what	a	political	culture	built	around	real	resistance	to	heteronomy	and	passivity	might	look	like.	Given	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	subjectivity,	what	would	resistance	to	heteronomy	entail?	Escaping																																																									8	At	lecture	at	Círculo	de	Bellas	Artes	de	Madrid	(Spain),	delivered	on	June	28th	2017		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OYSMWJafAI&	
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passivity	and	heteronomy	would	necessarily	entail	subverting	our	habits	of	perception	and	action.	This	follows	from	the	idea	that	habituation	is	a	kind	of	heteronomy	and	should	therefore	be	resisted.	There’s	an	episode	of	a	YouTube	video	series	on	science	called	SmarterEveryDay	that	addresses	this.	In	the	episode,	Destin	(the	YouTuber)	recounts	his	attempt	to	learn	how	to	ride	a	‘backwards	bicycle’	9.	The	bicycle	functions	exactly	like	any	other	bicycle	except	that	when	you	turn	the	handle	left,	the	wheel	turns	right,	and	vice	versa.	In	the	video	Destin	attempts	to	ride	it,	failing	almost	immediately.	Bringing	the	bicycle	with	him	to	talks	all	over	the	world,	person	after	person	fails	exactly	as	Destin	did,	unable	to	keep	the	wheel	straight.	Destin	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	knowledge	does	not	equal	
understanding.	Even	though	he	knows	what	he	needs	to	do	to	make	the	bike	move	the	way	he	wants,	he	can’t	actually	do	it.	Something	isn’t	letting	him.	As	Destin	put	it	in	the	video,	“once	you	have	a	rigid	way	of	thinking	in	your	head,	sometimes	you	cannot	change	that,	even	if	you	want	to”.	I	want	to	suggest	that	there	is	something	very	similar	about	the	idea	of	building	a	society	based	on	resisting	heteronomy.	We	have	the	theoretical	knowledge	of	the	material	steps	we	need	to	take	to	resist	heteronomy	but	we	do	not	really	understand	the	practicality	of	what	it	would	entail.	Destin	has	theoretical	knowledge	of	what	he	needs	to	do	to	ride	the	backwards	bike,	but	his	body	won’t	let	him.	Both	expectations	disregard	the	kinds	of	creatures	of	habit	we	are.		Ultimately	Destin	spent	five	minutes	per	day	for	eight	months	practicing	and	was	finally	able	to	ride	the	backward	bicycle.	The	only	problem	was	that	it	resulted	in	his	no	longer	being	able	to	ride	the	normal	bicycle.	In	a	way,	Purcell’s	social	mobilization	expects	us	to	inhabit	a	space	between	heteronomy	and	autonomy,	a	space	right	before	something	becomes	habit.	It	is	as	if	he	wants	us	to	simultaneously	occupy	the	space	between	riding	a	normal	bike	and	a	backward	bike,	a	space	I	would	argue	we	are	incapable	of	inhabiting.	Indeed,	we	inevitably	fall	to	one	aspect	of	being	or	the	other,	but	not	both.	Therefore	I	want	to	suggest	that	it	is	not	plausible	to	expect	that	subjectivity	can	overcome,	while	perhaps	not	completely,	at																																																									9	Worth	watching:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFzDaBzBlL0	
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least	significantly,	its	tendency	toward	subjective	passivity	as	described	by	Purcell,	and	implied	by	Friedmann	(claim	2).	Passivity	is	a	crucial	aspect	of	subjectivity	in	that	it	allows	us	to	develop	habitual	perceptions	that	make	being	in	the	world	practical	and	possible.	It	is	true	that	this	fact	also	makes	humans	vulnerable	to	fundamentalism	and	errors	in	thinking.	The	remedy	is	not	to	resist	passivity	and	habit,	but	to	acknowledge	and	better	understand	its	role	in	politics.	I	also	think	this	offers	a	justification	for	heteronomy	in	politics.	While	Purcell	wanted	to	get	beyond	Ranciere’s	view	of	the	political	as	momentary	eruption	and	reconfiguration	of	the	police	order,	I	would	argue	it	is	a	view	much	more	consistent	with	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology.			 [For	Ranciere],	the	democratic	eruption	of	the	people	that	destabilizes	the	partage	du	senible	can	never	be	a	breakthrough,	as	in	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	nor	a	generalization	of	autogestion,	as	in	Lefebvre,	nor	a	hegemonic	shift,	as	in	Laclau	and	Mouffe.	Rather,	the	outcome	is	always	a	resettling,	an	institution	of	a	new	police	order	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	70).		Indeed,	subjectivity	can	reconfigure	its	habituation	in	much	the	same	way	Ranciere	describes	a	reconfiguration	of	the	police	order.	A	moment	of	clarity	where	I	can	suddenly	ride	the	backwards	bicycle.	Purcell	wants	this	breakthrough	moment	of	resistance	to	heteronomy	to	become	the	generalized	norm.	But	based	on	what	I	have	argued,	this	seems	impossible.		I	do	want	to	affirm	the	importance	of	social	struggles	for	planning	and	politics.	They	can	play	a	hugely	important	role	in	changing	society	for	the	better	by,	as	Ranciere	would	argue,	reconfiguring	the	police	order.	But	we	must	understand	their	limits	in	a	broader	human	context.				
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Conclusion		In	the	above	pages	I	argued	that	social	mobilization	is	a	flawed	view	of	planning.	From	both	an	ethical	and	practical	perspective,	social	mobilizations	offers	little	justification	for	believing	it	to	be	inherently	preferable.	Despite	this	I	want	to	emphasize	that	I	think	social	movements	are	crucially	important	for	any	free	and	progressive	society.	Rather	than	reading	me	as	arguing	that	social	mobilization	should	be	completely	condemned,	I	should	be	read	as	trying	to	determine	some	limits	for	how	social	mobilization	can	be	reasonably	invoked	and	discussed	as	a	solution.	I	want	social	movements	to	be	part	of	a	progressive	political	future	just	not	at	the	expense	of	all	potential	solutions.	My	objection	is	not	with	social	mobilization,	but	how	theorists	like	Friedmann	and	Purcell	transform	it	into	a	totalizing	purity	politics	that	sees	any	transgression	of	the	struggle	for	autonomy	as	contributing	to	the	problem.	Thus,	this	major	paper	should	be	read	as	a	plea	for	nuanced	thinking	in	planning	theory.	Indeed,	I	endorse	thinking	that	doesn’t	reject	the	impurity	of	mixed	solutions	involving	autonomy	and	heteronomy	in	politics.	Purity	politics	does	nothing	but	limit	our	ability	to	evaluate	a	problem	from	many	different	perspectives.				 I	want	to	also	offer	a	preliminary	defense	of	planning	theories	that	focus	on	moral	considerations	of	justice.	An	example	is	Margaret	Kohn’s	solidarist	argument	for	the	right	to	the	city.	The	idea	is	essentially	that	the	city	as	a	division	of	labour,	creates	a	social	product	that	should	not	belong	solely	to	individual	property	owners.	This	is	because	the	city	is	not	reducible	to	a	collection	of	individuals,	but	a	collectively	and	historically	produced	commonwealth.	Put	another	way,	an	incredibly	wealthy	property	owner	relies	on	the	city’s	existence,	and	all	the	people	in	the	present	and	past	that	have	contributed	to	its	construction	and	development.	Indeed,	property	in	a	city	is	valuable	because	many	people	live	and	work	there.	Based	in	this,	the	solidarist	argues	that	when	someone	accumulates	a	disproportionate	share	of	wealth	they	should	have	a	moral	and	contractual	obligation	to	assist	the	worst	off	people	in	the	city	(Kohn,	2016,	p.	24-25).	This	is	
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essentially	a	moral	argument	for	redistribution	of	wealth.	One	of	the	limits	of	social	mobilization	is	that	its	not	clear	how	it	would	arrive	at	a	similar	conclusion,	nor	how	if	could	enforce	this	kind	of	redistribution.	This	is	because	social	mobilization	is	not	based	on	explicit	principles	of	fairness.	Of	course,	social	movements	might	contribute	to	a	popular	movement	that	demands	something	like	a	solidarist	redistribution	of	urban	wealth.	However,	I	also	think	there	is	something	morally	valuable	about	having	institutions	that	enforce	newly	decided	upon	principles	of	justice.	In	a	social	mobilization	model	morally	preferable	arrangement	become	difficult	to	secure	since	all	mechanisms	of	enforcement	are	judged	with	suspicion.		 Finally,	I	want	to	make	some	final	remarks	on	the	political	implications	human	frailty.	While	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	provided	an	account	of	how	subjectivity	and	perception	are	influenced	by	habit,	there	are	many	streams	of	science	that	reveal	related	shortcomings	and	vulnerabilities	in	human	judgment.	A	2011	study	found	that	parole	board	judges	grant	parole	just	after	lunch	breaks	at	a	rate	of	65	percent	compared	to	as	low	as	3	percent	just	before	lunch.	This	suggests	that	judgment	might	be	incredibly	vulnerable	to	hunger	(Danziger,	Levav,	&	Avnaim-Pesso,	2011).	Another	study	found	that	the	amount	of	food	a	person	will	eat	can	be	significantly	influenced	by	the	size	and	color	of	the	dinner	plate	(Van	Ittersum	&	Wansink,	2012).	Or	to	take	a	more	famous	example,	the	Milgram	experiment	showed	how	up	to	65	percent	of	participants	could	be	convinced	to	administer	a	fatal	shock	to	a	stranger	if	a	figure	of	authority	(a	man	in	a	lab	coat)	instructed	them	to	do	so	(Milgram,	1963).		My	point	is	to	remind	us	how	vulnerable	human	beings	are	to	suggestion	and	poor	judgment.	At	the	same	time,	we	are	capable	of	identifying	those	vulnerabilities	in	moments	of	reflective	consideration	and	evidence	analysis.	However,	as	Merleau-Ponty	reveals,	these	moments	of	reflective	analysis	are	just	that,	moments.	Most	of	the	time	we	remain	vulnerable	to	mistakes	and	suggestion.	Knowing	this,	it	seems	reasonable	to	prefer	a	political	structure	that	tries	as	best	as	possible	to	correct	for	these	vulnerabilities	through,	for	example,	legal	and	regulatory	frameworks.	This	kind	of	view	is	likely	to	be	unacceptable	for	purveyors	of	social	mobilization	since	it	affirms	the	need	for	heteronomy.	In	a	healthy	political	community	such	frameworks	
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should	of	course	be	open	to	constant	revision	and	critique.	But	based	on	what	we	know	about	human	beings	it	seems	patently	irresponsible	to	suggest	we	should	struggle	against	anything	that	resembles	heteronomy.															
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